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U/C sees the A, thin & haggard w/ swollen hands
A paces nervously on corner for 10 minutes
U/C approaches A and asks for "horse"
A nods in silent agreement
A takes $20 PRBM from U/C, goes into a hotel, emerges
with two glassines of heroin, hands heroin to U/C, U/C
walks away
Ghost observes entire transaction from car
A/O arrests A for 220.39
In SILA, A has no PRBM or heroin
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INTRODUCTION
In the cryptic shorthand' typical of police and
prosecutorial paperwork, the above narrative tells the basic
story of a purchase of illegal drugs by an undercover police
officer. Such a purchase is more commonly known as a
"buy and bust" operation. Across the United States, buy
and bust operations occur frequently as federal and state
law enforcement officers wage the war on drugs.' In the
twenty-first century, the stakes in the longstanding war on
drugs are high as law enforcement and national security
agencies join forces to confront the disturbing ties between
terrorism 4 and illegal narcotics. 5
1. A guide to abbreviations (in order of their appearance): U/C means
undercover officer; A means defendant; "horse" is slang for heroin; PRBM means
pre-recorded buy money and refers to paper currency whose serial numbers are
recorded prior to the drug purchases so that they can easily be identified and
introduced as relevant physical evidence if recovered by police upon arrest; ghost
refers to undercover officers who are assigned to serve as backup to the
purchasing undercover officer during the buy and bust operation; A/O means
arresting officer; 220.39 refers to the section in New York's Penal Law for
Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree; and SILA means
search incident to lawful arrest.
2. Actual buy and bust operations can vary in scale and complexity, ranging
from the quick street trade where small amounts of drugs are allegedly purchased
for personal use to closed door transactions that involve much greater quantities
of drugs and money and many more interactions over a longer period of time. As
one observer quipped, buy and bust operations, also known as B & Bs, are the
"bread-and-butter of street-level drug enforcement." Michael Massing, The Fix 60
(1998).
3. In 1968, presidential candidate Richard Nixon coined the exact phrase and
launched the "war on drugs." See Dan Baum, Smoke and Mirrors: The War on
Drugs and the Politics of Failure 11 (1996) (depicting the war on drugs as a
political ploy to garner votes). It would continue to be a central theme of his
presidency. See David Corn, Eric Gravley, & Jefferson Morley, Drug Czars We
Have Known, The Nation, Feb. 27, 1989, at 258 (noting July 14, 1969 as the date
when President Richard Nixon first sought to eradicate the national drug
problem).
4. See Phin MacDonald, What about Bin Laden's Drug Empire, Wash.
Times, Oct 17, 2001, available at http'//www.mapinc.org/drugnewsv01ln17841
a03.html?1402 (last visited Nov. 8, 2004) (indicating that although there is no
concrete evidence linking Bin Laden's drug profits to the Sept. 11 attacks, a
critical part of the War on Terrorism includes cutting off the funding of terrorists
via the drug trade); Edward T. Pound & Chitra Ragavan, "Tears of Allah":
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In addition to being a weapon in the arsenal of law
enforcement, the buy and bust operation also tells an
interesting story about motive in the criminal law. This
may not be obvious at first glance. However, this article
uses the simple street sale' to demonstrate how the
criminal law suffers from its ambivalent attitude towards
the role that motive should play.
Because the simple street sale remains the
predominant way through which illegal drugs arrive in the
hands of individual buyers and addicts, law enforcement and
hence the criminal law have had to and will continue to deal
with the simple street sale. While the inherent transaction
may be the focus of law enforcement due to longstanding
policies to criminalize certain addictive drugs, jurisdictions
Another Weapon in Osama bin Laden's War Against the West, available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/terror/articies/heroin.htm (Oct. 4, 2001)
(last visited Nov. 8, 2004) (discussing Bin Laden's alleged involvement with the
distribution of a highly potent form of heroin in the United States); James Rosen,
Drug Trade Filled Coffers of Taliban, Bin Laden Group, Minneapolis Star Trib.,
Sept. 30 2001, at 21A (linking money generated through American heroin sales to
Osama Bin Laden).
5. In some contexts, there are fine scientific definitions for the terms drugs
and narcotics. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 220.00(7) (2005); N.Y. Pub. Health Law
§3306 (2005). However, this article will use the terms drugs and narcotics
interchangeably to mean illegal drugs, especially those of an addictive nature.
See The American Heritage Dictionary 427, 830 (William Morris ed., 2d. college
ed. 1982) (defining drug as a narcotic, especially one that is addictive, and
narcotic as a drug that dulls the senses, induces sleep, and becomes addictive
with prolonged use).
Marijuana is excluded from the article's consideration because both popular
attitudes and penal laws regard marijuana as a lesser drug than cocaine or
heroin. Compare N.Y. Penal Law § 221.35 (2005) (categorizing the sale of any
quantity of marijuana as a Class B misdemeanor) with N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39
(2005) (categorizing sale of narcotics such as cocaine as a Class B felony). For a
discussion indicating that marijuana legalization has gained more favorable
support in recent years, see generally USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/200]1/08/23/marijuana-poll.htm (last visited
Dec. 7, 2004).
6. This article uses the phrase simple street sale to refer to those transactions
at the final stage of distribution whereby illicit drugs move into the hands of
individual drug abusers. Often, such transactions occur physically on the public
streets, hence the term. They usually involve modest amounts of drugs and
money such as two glassines of heroin and twenty dollars. In addition, the
participants in the transactions are typically strangers to one another with no
prior communication or relationships.
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continue to struggle in deciding which participants in the
simple street sale to condemn for what offenses and the
appropriate relative punishments. For example, the
defendant in the above narrative engaged in what is
commonly known as steering behavior and may even be
referred to as a steerer.7 Should his acts be regarded as a
crime? If so, what crime? Sale, or possession? Sale and
possession? Or something else altogether? What would be
an appropriate punishment? These same questions are also
applicable to the other two participants.
Conceptually, this challenge is nothing new. The
questions, "Whom to punish?" and "How much to punish?"
are the very foundational issues that have long occupied
punishment theorists. In order to achieve proportional
justice, it is necessary to contemplate these questions.
What is interesting about the context of the simple street
sale is that asking these two questions leads to
consideration of motive. Each of the three participants in
the above narrative surely had a different reason for their
participation. But should motive determine their offense?
Should motive determine their penalty?
Traditionalists answer no. Generations of scholars of
the criminal law have learned that motive is irrelevant in
the criminal law." It is especially irrelevant with respect to
liability for a crime.9 Recently though, several criminal law
scholars and legal philosophers have begun to debate the
role of motive in the criminal law.10 Interestingly, both
7. There are numerous terms that describe with technical precision various
participants in a simple street sale. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
This article uses the terms steerer and steering to refer to any individual who
connects drug addicts to drug dealers.
8. See Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 88 (2d ed. 1960)
("Hardly any part of penal law is more definitely settled than that motive is
irrelevant."); see also Douglas N. Husak, Motive and Criminal Liability, 8 Crim.
Just. Ethics 3, 3 (1989) ("This thesis is endorsed, sometimes with minor
qualifications, by almost all leading criminal theorists.").
9. See Husak, supra note 8, at 3; Whitley R.P. Kaufman, Motive, Intention,
and Morality in the Criminal Law, 28 Crim. Just. Rev. 317, 317 (2003).
10. Professor Kaufman describes the recent trend as a "countermovement" led
by Professor Husak against the orthodox view that motive is irrelevant. See
Kaufman, supra note 9, at 317. The short piece by Professor Husak was
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traditionalists and critics concede that contrary to the
famous irrelevance maxim, motive has been relevant for a
long time in some significant instances in the criminal law.1'
Where they disagree is whether motive should assume an
even greater role.12 Traditionalists and critics are currently
engaged in defining the appropriate parameters for
considerations of motive in the criminal law.13
Against this backdrop of discussion about motive and
the criminal law, jurisdictions have approached the
challenge of criminalizing simple street sales in a variety of
groundbreaking. See supra note 8.
In addition, there are other figures in this countermovement. See, e.g. Alan
Norrie, 'Simulacra of Morality'? Beyond the Ideal/Actual Antinomies of Criminal
Justice, in Philosophy and the Criminal Law 101 (Antony Duff ed., 1998); Guyora
Binder, The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (2002)
(dismissing the irrelevance of motive maxim as either a descriptively false
statement or only trivially true by definition).
Some of the discussion has been inspired by the rise of contemporary issues
such as hate crimes and cultural defenses. See, e.g. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Bias
Crimes: What Do Haters Deserve?, 11 Crim. Just. Ethics 20, 21-22 (1992); Martin
B. Margulies, Intent, Motive, and the R.A.V. Decision, 11 Crim. Just. Ethics 42,
44-45 (1992); Adam Candeub, Comment, Motive Crimes and Other Minds, 142 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 2071 (1994). For two court opinions that draw opposite conclusions
about the constitutionality of motive elements in hate crime statutes, see the
Supreme Court opinion in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (finding it is
constitutional for a state to use motive in both offense definition and in
sentencing) and the state opinion it overturned in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485
N.W.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. Wis. 1992) (declaring the hate crime statute is
unconstitutional because of a First Amendment violation).
11. Longstanding exculpatory motives that eliminate criminal liability include
self-defense in the use of physical force, necessity in the avoidance of greater
harm and heat of passion. See Walter Wheeler Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive
in the Criminal Law, 26 Yale L.J. 645, 661-62 (1917); Binder, supra note 10, at 48
(2002). Examples of inculpatory motives are specific intent crimes such as
burglary and inchoate offenses like attempt and conspiracy. See Walter H.
Hitchler, Motive as an Essential Element of Crime, 35 Dick. L. Rev. 105, 111,
113-14 (1931). See also supra text accompanying notes 42.
12. See, e.g. Hyman Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice (1979); Husak, supra
note 8; Norrie, supra note 10; Alan Norrie, Punishment, Responsibility and
Justice (2000).
13. See, e.g. Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the
Role of Motive in Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 635 (1993)
(advocating that motive should be limited to narrow defenses and not used in
offense definition or in discretionary sentencing); Richard G. Singer, Just Deserts:
Sentencing Based on Equality and Desert 81 (1979) (criticizing the relegation of
motive to sentencing as both duplicitous and undesirable).
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ways. Some have chosen to pay little attention to motive
while others have done the opposite and over-accommodated
it. This article focuses on the unique approach adopted by
New York State known as the agency defense. This defense
allows the defendant in our narrative, the steerer, to be
treated as nothing more than a purchasing agent for his
principal, the ultimate buyer 14 of the heroin. In order to be
treated as an agent, a jury must conclude that the defendant
is motivated into steering by a desire to help the undercover
police officer. There must be no self-interest involved.
Once this motive is established, 5 status as an agent
leads to an acquittal of the serious sale charges16 on two
distinct grounds. First, an agent cannot be guilty of any
charge different from his principal. Secondly, an agent is
merely giving to the principal what his principal already
owns. He is not selling anything to his principal. The
result of either line of reasoning is that the defendant is not
guilty of sale and is only guilty of a relatively minor offense
of criminal possession of a controlled substance. 7
14. The article uses the phrase ultimate buyer to refer to the participant in the
simple street sale who purchases the drugs for his own use. See infra text
accompanying notes 201-03. In this case, the undercover police officer is the
ultimate buyer and hence, the principal. The identity of the principal as a
member of law enforcement is not significant for the legal reasoning of the agency
defense. Moreover, the term ultimate may indeed be relative in that after
attaining the glassines of heroin, the principal could immediately give them to yet
another person later that same evening. If the principal faced a criminal charge
of sale, he could then bring his own agency defense too.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 193-201.
16. In New York State, criminal sale of a controlled substance is an offense
that can be classified as one of five different level felonies. The particular level
felony for any one particular sale varies with the weight and nature of the
controlled substance being sold. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 220.43, 220.41, 220.39,
220.34, and 220.31 (2004). Prior to December 2004, the potential jail terms for a
first time offender ranged from one to three years for the lowest level felony to
fifteen years to life for the highest level felony. See Barry Kamins, Sentencing
Guides, in Gould's Criminal Law Handbook of New York (2004).
The most recent legislative changes have reduced the terms to one to one-
and-a-half years for the lowest level felony to eight to twenty years for the highest
level felony. New Sentencing Chart for Drug Offenses Under Rockefeller Drug
Law Reform, available at http://www.communityalternatives.org/articles/
sentencingchart.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2005). See also infra text
accompanying notes 243-61.
17. Again, because this article and the agency defense are focused on simple
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New York State's agency defense is intriguing in the
discussion of motive and the criminal law because its
litmus test is expressed directly in terms of a defendant's
motive. Indeed, the use of the term motive is quite
remarkable. There are numerous classic examples1 8 of
where the criminal law is substantively focusing on a
defendant's motive; however, these examples do not do so
explicitly. In this way the agency defense appears to be a
progressive example of where judges and juries are openly
using a defendant's motive to determine his liability for a
crime. This appearance, however, is misleading.
While effective for some fortunate defendants, the
ability to be successful with agency defense in New York is
unpredictable. Trial courts do not consistently grant
requests for juries to be instructed on the agency defense
and also give nonuniform instructions. This lack of
coherence and consistency is easily explained by the basic
fallacy of the agency defense. The reality of the drug trade,
especially on the street, is that steerers are not purchasing
agents for the ultimate buyers. Indeed, the notion that
buyers acquire fiduciary representation from a stranger in
the span of a brief and illicit conversation is both absurd and
humorous. Steerers do not act out of some selfless desire to
help a complete stranger. Steering a drug deal is not akin to
the altruistic act of giving directions in your neighborhood to
someone who is lost. While a charming concept, a principal-
agency relationship between a steerer and the ultimate drug
buyer is simply not true. The truth is that these defendants
steer drugs to support their own habits. This fundamental
lack of truth is at the root of the inconsistency.
Perhaps this attempt to explain the inconsistent
application of the agency defense approaches too much
street sales of relatively minor quantities of drugs such as two glassines of heroin,
the possession offense is only a misdemeanor. See N.Y. Penal Law § 220.03
(2005). There is no jail term required; instead, non-jail penalties such as
community service, drug treatment programs, and probation are common. See
Kamins, supra note 16.
18. Examples include specific intent crimes like burglary and defenses like
self-defense. See infra text accompanying notes 43-44.
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unforgiving literalism. The agency defense may be similar
to other valid, well-intentioned attempts to describe in legal
terms what goes on in real life.19 Such attempts do not need
to be perfectly accurate to be legitimate. Some may be
comforted by this half-hearted excuse for the agency defense;
however, this article posits that the incoherence and
inconsistency of this legal fiction is inexcusable and
unnecessary. There is no need for yet another legal fiction
in the criminal law. While it does indeed address motive
explicitly, the agency defense disguises the actual
underlying empathy for the drug problems of steerers.
Literally it claims to allow those who act out of selfless
interest for their principals to escape criminal liability. In
actuality, though, the agency defense allows those steerers
who suffer from their own drug addictions and who act to
satisfy their cravings to escape from liability.
The agency defense survives and thrives in New York
State because it serves as a convenient political
compromise for juries, judges, and legislators. Judges,
juries, and legislators resist the honest consideration of a
defendant's drug addiction and instead rely on the legal
fiction of an agency defense. There are two reasons for
their resistance. First, they have been unable to overcome
the ambivalence and disagreement in the criminal law over
the role motive should have in determinations of liability
and punishment. Second, Americans are torn on the
question of whether drug addiction should eliminate
liability for a crime and/or reduce the severity of a
sentence. They are concerned about public safety. In
addition, drug addiction is an example of a motive for
which there are serious problems with both its provability
and its moral potency. Because of these problems, there is
no community consensus on whether the criminal law
should accommodate drug addiction. Thus, the criminal
law does not accommodate drug addiction, at least not
19. For example, transferred intent is another legal fiction in criminal law
that allows for liability for an accidental death by "transferring" guilty mens rea
directed at another target to the dead victim. See Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal
Law §§ 6.3(d) & 6.4(d) (4th ed. 2003).
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openly. This article concludes that a more honest and
broader acceptance of motive in the criminal law will lead
to elimination of the agency defense fiction and the
adoption of more flexible sentencing and liability
determinations. Greater flexibility would allow for
appropriate consideration of motives like drug addiction
and the achievement of proportional justice without the
costs of unpredictable and incoherent legal precedent.
Logically, such improvements will ultimately create greater
respect for the rule of criminal law.
Part I of the article joins the evolving discussion of
motive in the criminal law generally. To support the
overall conclusion that motive should figure more
prominently in the criminal law, part I proposes several
novel ideas. First, although some other scholars are fixated
with whether motive should be limited to determinations of
either liability or punishment, this article proposes that
decision makers should be free to consider motive when
determining both. Second, part I explains that not all
motives are the same. Indeed, motives such as self-
defense, insanity, and heat of passion clearly differ in
terms of their provability and moral potency. While some
may be more easily proven, others possess greater moral
potency. Because of these critical differences, part I of this
article proposes that motives which are easily proven and
possess high moral potency be part of liability
determinations while motives that present proof problems
or low moral potency be restricted to sentencing. Third,
part I ends with a sweeping recommendation to reform the
overall attitude about motive in the criminal law. Far from
being irrelevant to the criminal law and unworkable,
motive should be thought of as essential. The criminal law
should not limit itself to consideration of a few select
motives; instead, it should welcome the challenge of
incorporating defendants' various motives. With the
freedom of multiple forums and the guidelines of
provability and moral potency, an effective criminal law
built around motive can be successfully developed.
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Part II then turns to the simple street sale and New
York's agency defense and the intriguing lesson they offer
for considerations of motive in the criminal law. Part II
begins by analyzing the challenge of defining the offenses
and punishments for various participants in the simple
street sale and how the agency defense was designed to
address this challenge. It continues with the history of how
federal courts led state courts in the adoption of the
judicially created agency defense and how Congress then
eliminated it by statute in adopting the distribution
approach to the war on drugs. In conclusion, part II
describes instances of legal inconsistency produced by the
agency defense in New York.
As a contrast to the fiction of the agency defense, part
III turns to the reality of the street drug trade. The article
finally concludes in part III by taking two positions. First,
the agency defense is nothing more than a poorly disguised
ruse to suspend criminal liability for drug addicts who may
steer and help other drug addicts in completing drug
transactions on the streets. It should be abandoned in New
York State. Second, a more honest and effective criminal
law would allow for flexible and explicit consideration of
more motives including drug addiction. Because drug
addiction may feature problems of provability and low
moral potency, it is best to replace the agency defense with
mandatory consideration of addiction at sentencing for
now. If Americans ever achieve moral consensus on the
problem of crime motivated by drug addiction, then
perhaps at that future point elimination or mitigation of
criminal liability may be possible.
The narcotic buy and bust operation has long been a
central weapon in the arsenal of law enforcement agencies
fighting the war on drugs. Despite its longstanding
history, jurisdictions have yet to adopt satisfactory
approaches to the conundrum of how to penalize each
participant in the simple street sale. Efforts such as the
agency defense in New York State have largely failed
because of the great tension within the criminal law of how
to accommodate the motives of those defendants with
662
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whom we empathize. This tension is certainly not unique
to narcotics sales prosecutions, but the story of the simple
street sale provides a valuable glimpse at how the criminal
law needs to go further in addressing the current
constraints on motive. Only by significantly shifting
attitudes towards motive can we hope to build a more
meaningful and effective criminal law.
I. THE ROLE OF MOTIVE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
A. The Irrelevance Maxim
As Jerome Hall so pithily stated in 1960, "[hlardly any
part of penal law is more definitely settled than that
motive is irrelevant."20 Many scholars are quick to clarify
that this terse maxim refers to the irrelevance of motive for
determinations of liability while leaving intact its
pertinence for determinations of punishment.21 Earnest
defenders of the maxim further qualify the pithy phrase:
"The orthodox doctrine holds that motive is irrelevant to
criminal liability unless it is specifically made relevant as
part of the definition of a crime... or unless there is an
established criminal defense that requires the
establishment of a motive (e.g., duress)."22 Although stated
for the purpose of defending the irrelevance maxim, such
qualifications are basically a concession that specific intent
crimes, inchoate crimes, and the defenses of provocation,
insanity, necessity, and self-defense have long regarded the
motives of a defendant in determining criminal liability.
So, while it may make a well-settled and pithy statement,
the declaration that motive is irrelevant is not even
descriptively true. Both defenders and critics of the maxim
largely agree on this point; however, they loudly disagree
as to whether motive should or should not be even more
relevant to the criminal law than it currently is.
20. Hall, supra note 8, at 88.
21. See e.g., Kaufman, supra note 9.
22. Kaufman, supra note 9, at 318.
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B. What Is Motive?
In order to understand their normative disagreements
better, let's elaborate on exactly what motive is. Motive is
a concept that at first seems to lend itself easily to
definition. It is most simply the reason a defendant does
what he does. Upon deeper reflection though, the task of
defining motive quickly becomes more complicated,
especially when juxtaposed against the concept of intent or
mens rea. This is an interesting juxtaposition because
while both motive and intent refer to mental states, one
has been deemed irrelevant to criminal liability while the
other is central to it.23
In this debate on motive numerous efforts have been
made to define it. These efforts divide into three groups.
Some have defined motive as completely different from
intent while others have argued that motive is a particular
type or sub-category of intent. Still others, like Douglas
Husak, have offered more functional definitions. The first
group regards intentions as "cognitive states of mind, like
expectations or perceptions of risk" while describing
motives as "desiderative states," meaning "desires,
purposes or ends.2 4 In other words, "motives explain why a
person acted, while intentions describe what action was
performed. 25  While appealingly simple, this definition
renders the maxim of irrelevance untrue.26 It is untrue
that the criminal law never considers why a person acts in
determining liability.27
23. See Husak, supra note 8, at 5 ("The exceptional significance Anglo-
American criminal law attaches to intention stands in stark contrast to its
(alleged) complete disregard of motive.").
24. Binder, supra note 10, at 4.
25. Husak, supra note 8, at 6; see also Gross, supra note 12, at 111 ("[A]
motive can be distinguished from an intention as an explanation of an act and not
a description of it.").
26. See Binder, supra note 10, at 4.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 43-44. 'One might well take the
position that it would be better to abandon the difficult task of trying to
distinguish intent from motive and merely acknowledge that the substantive
criminal law takes account of some desired ends but not others." LaFave, supra
note 19, § 5.3(a), at 259 (4th ed. 2003).
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The second group of efforts is inapposite. Motive is not
a different mental state from intent; rather, it is a sub-type
of intent. Motive is defined as the "ulterior" intention or
"the intention with which an intentional act is done. ' 8
Although at first this definition rings true, this definition
ultimately offers a meaningless distinction between motive
and intent. Because people act in a "chain of intention,"
every intent is a motive for a prior or earlier intent.2 9 For
example, a defendant pulls the trigger of a gun in order to
make the bullet enter a victim's body in order to kill the
victim in order to steal his possessions, etc.30 As a result, the
only distinction between motive and intent are insignificant
moments of time where "[an intention ceases to remain a
motive only when it becomes immediate."31 If there is such
spare distinction between motive and intent, then
normatively the statement that the criminal law should be
engaged only with the most immediate of intents is weak.
Critics have harshly ridiculed this second definition of
motive. They contend that because motive and intent are
essentially the same, the statement that motive is irrelevant
to the criminal law can only be true as a tautology where
motive is defined as all those intentions that have been
deemed, for one reason or another, irrelevant. In contrast,
all those that have been deemed relevant are designated as
intent or mens rea 3
Finally, the third group of efforts rejects the approach
of juxtaposing motive against intent or mens rea. Instead,
these definitions of motive focus on the mental function
that motive represents. According to Douglas Husak,
motives may "be understood as a 'polymorphous collection
28. Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part § 21, at 48 (2d ed.
1961), quoted in Husak, supra note 8, at 5.
29. See id.
30. See Husak, supra note 8, at 5-6.
31. Husak, supra note 8, at 6.
32. See Antony Duff, Principle and Contradiction in the Criminal Law:
Motives and Criminal Liability, in Philosophy and the Criminal Law, supra note
10, at 156, 173 (refers to this as "definitional truth"); Husak, supra note 8, at 6
(refers to this as a "vacuous tautology").
33. See infra text accompanying note 44.
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of action initiators.' 34 These motives may be further
intentions, reasons, or other undefined mental states; their
categorization is not important. Hyman Gross offers that
"a motive.., is a reason for doing the kind of purposeful
act that calls for an explanation and that is done by the
actor for the sake of something else." 6 Having a motive for
an action is simply believing that "some end will be
furthered by performing it, and... [wanting] or [desiring]
... to further that end."3 7
This article adopts this third functional definition of
motive because it strives to define motive independent of
intent and mens rea. Freed from any need to compare to
intent or mens rea, the functional approach comes closer to
defining motive as it is understood by laypeople .3  This
connection to lay usage of the term motive is valuable
because it supports one key argument for enhancing the role
of motive in criminal law. That argument is the importance
of aligning legal norms to social norms in designing effective
criminal laws.39 Furthermore, a functional definition allows
for easy comprehension.
C. Motive Is Already Relevant
Understanding motive as the "action initiator" behind
a defendant's acts, it is clear that motive already influences
determinations of liability. First, on a very basic level, the
presence or absence of a motive may be helpful in
determining whether a defendant acted intentionally or
34. Christine Sistare, Agent Motives and the Criminal Law, 13 Soc. Theory &
Prac. 303, 306 (1987), quoted in Husak, supra note 8, at 8.
35. See Husak, supra note 8, at 8.
36. Gross, supra note 12, at 111.
37. P. Grice, Motive and Reason, in Practical Reasoning 168 (Joseph Raz ed.
1978), quoted in Husak, supra note 8, at 8.
38. In the American Heritage Dictionary motive is defined as "an emotion,
desire, physiological need, or similar impulse acting as an incitement to action."
The American Heritage Dictionary 517 (William Morris ed., 2d college ed. 1991).
39. See Tracey L. Meares, It's a Question of Connections, 31 Val. U. L. Rev
579, 582 (1997) (theorizing that the law is least likely to be obeyed when legal
norms do not reflect social norms and most likely to be obeyed when they do).
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unintentionally.4 °  This is because not every act of a
defendant is accompanied by a cognizable "action
initiator."41 Indeed, arguably only intentional acts are done
with a motive in mind. Acts for which a defendant may
have no motive may be those unintentional acts committed
recklessly or negligently.42 Thus, motive is already of
tremendous significance in determining a defendant's mens
rea and therefore his criminal liability.
In addition to this basic consideration of motive,
traditional criminal law also focuses on motive in special
limited circumstances. For example, common law has long
provided that a defendant may assault another person if
the defendant was doing so in order to defend himself from
"the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such
other person. "43  Although jurisdictions may vary with
respect to the fine details of this right to self-defense, they
all share the need to analyze the reason or "action-
initiator" behind the defendant's acts. Only if the reason
fits within a narrowly defined category is the defendant
then absolved of his otherwise criminal assault. This
traditional right to self-defense clearly determines liability
based on motive.
Another longstanding defense that operates in a
similar fashion is necessity. Necessity requires that a
defendant commit a crime because of a need to avoid an
even greater harm. Still a third common law defense that
40. See Husak, supra note 8, at 8. In addition to being evidence of an
intentional mens rea, motive is also highly regarded as powerful circumstantial
evidence of overall guilt: "[o]n the procedural side, a motive for committing a
crime is relevant in proving guilt when the evidence of guilt is
circumstantial. . ... " LaFave, supra note 19, § 5.3, at 256.
Also as any amateur sleuth can advise, good detective work includes
searching for someone with a motive when trying to determine the perpetrator of
an unsolved crime. See Gross, supra note 12, at 103.
41. See Gross, supra note 12, at 110-11.
42. See id.
43. N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15 (2005) ("A person may... use physical force upon
another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be
necessary to defend himself, herself, or a third person from what he or she
reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by
such other person....").
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considers motive is mistake of fact where a defendant lacks
an illicit motive because he acted under mistaken factual
belief. All three of these defenses conclude that it is unjust
and perhaps ineffective to inflict punishment on defendants
who act without an evil motive and instead act because of
fear or a belief that their acts are privileged."
Beyond these defenses, the common law also uses
motive as an offense element of specific intent crimes. The
classic example of a specific intent crime is burglary where
a defendant's purpose in breaking and entering a premises
must be to commit a further crime once inside. Once again,
unless the defendant's reason or "action-initiator" fits
within this narrowly defined category, that defendant will
not be guilty of the crime of burglary. Modem examples of
where motive is an offense element are stalking and hate
crimes. The presence or absence of a particular motive is a
determinative factor.
What is interesting about these traditional defenses
and offenses is that in order to steer clear of the irrelevance
maxim, motive is not identified as such. The term motive is
not used and sometimes it is even replaced by another term
or phrase such as specific intent. Specific intent could
easily be defined as those motives that are relevant for the
criminal law, notwithstanding the otherwise accurate and
pithy statement of motive's irrelevance. Some scholars
have criticized this refusal to acknowledge the language
and substance of motive in the criminal law. Because of
their critical analyses, there are more open discussions of
how motive already influences the criminal law, albeit only
under special limited circumstances. With the modern
examples of stalking and hate crimes, much of the
44. As Professor Gardner describes, these defenses developed in the evolution
of the evil motive tradition in the common law. Affirmative proof of an evil
motive used to be a prerequisite for criminal liability. However, as the modern
concept of mens rea or intent became the dominant approach to offense definition,
evil motives were relegated to the form of defenses like self-defense, necessity,
mistake of fact, insanity, and infancy. That was also the historical point in time
when the irrelevance maxim arose. Gardner, supra note 13, at 664-67, 694-95.
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controversy has surrounded the flagrant use of motive in
these criminal statutes.
D. Some Say Motive Should Not Be Relevant
Although it is not as starkly irrelevant as the original
pithy maxim would lead scholars to believe, overall current
criminal laws invoke the motives of defendants fairly
infrequently. Defenders of the irrelevance maxim have
provided several reasons for why motive should continue to
play only a limited, as opposed to central, role in the
criminal law. This article discusses two of these reasons.
The first is that the criminal law must only take into
account a small number of motives because of the need for
effective social control. In addition to expressing the moral
judgment of a community, the criminal law is also a
utilitarian tool for regulating the future behavior of
members of that community. If the criminal law were to
accommodate every sympathetic motive, then many more
defendants would either escape criminal liability or receive
much-reduced sentences. Social control would be crippled.
Thus, while not wholly consistent, the necessary
compromise is to allow for the consideration of motive but
only in those exceptionally sympathetic circumstances.45
The second reason not to expand the role of motive is
the need to preserve the institutional and historical
prerogative of legislatures in controlling the influence that
motive should have in the criminal law. This argument
rests on the belief that legislatures, as opposed to judges or
juries or other law enforcement agents, are best suited to
determine which motives should be singled out for
particular inculpatory or exculpatory treatment in the
criminal law. Because of the context of individual cases,
45. "[Critical theorists'] central argument is, rather, that once the law
recognises the kinds of motive-based defence that our law already recognises, in
accordance with its concern for individual responsibility, it has no good reason to
deny more radical extensions to such defences: but such extensions would utterly
undermine its role as an instrument of social control, and are for that reason...
rejected." Duff, supra note 32, at 179.
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courts are vulnerable to being preoccupied by the
"poignancy"46 of actual defendants and ignoring the "policy
implications of an extension of the law."47 In addition, it is
more democratic for an elected body of representatives to
handle collectively broad questions of moral condemnation
rather than individual jurists who may be appointed as
well as elected to their positions. Finally, use of the
proscriptive legislative process advances the principle of
legality.48 For all these reasons, the conclusion is "that the
legislative process, with its capacity for thorough
consideration and debate of policy complexities, is the
proper forum to shape all doctrinal aspects of the criminal
law."49  Thus, legislatures should be free to determine
"what kinds of motives should make what kind of difference
to criminal liability,"5 ° while courts should
attend only to the issue of whether the defendant's actions
matched the law's definition of a crime. They will thus
often have to attend to questions about what motivated the
defendant. Because such motivational questions will often
be relevant to her liability: but they must not attend to
motivational factors that are not declared relevant by the
law.51
Effective social control and legislative superiority are
admittedly persuasive arguments for leaving the criminal
law as it is, with limited consideration of motive in
determinations of liability and sentencing. The reasons are
even combinable in that there are arguably countless
motives or action-initiators behind the acts of defendants
and thus too many for legislatures to codify.2 While
persuasive though, they are ultimately not convincing.
46. Gardner, supra note 13, at 746.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 745-47 (expressing a special concern for legality with retroactive
abolition of justification defenses by courts).
49. Id. at 746.
50. Duff, supra note 32, at 174.
51. Id; see also Kaufman, supra note 9, at 318.
52. This was certainly the view of Jerome Hall, who strongly believed that
motive belonged only in matters of sentencing. See Hall, supra note 7, at 162-63.
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They can be overcome, at least in part, with more creative
ideas on how to use motive in the criminal law. Even more
importantly, excluding motive for the sake of effective
social control and legislative competence comes at too high
of a cost.
E. Why They're Wrong: Motive Must Be Relevant
Because the criminal law professes to be the means
through which a community expresses its moral
condemnation,53 it should consider motive. Motive is
essential because the reason why a defendant acts is
important in assessing the moral culpability of his acts.
Indeed, motive is at the core of our moral intuitions.54
Hyman Gross has put forth four dimensions of moral
culpability in his theory on criminal conduct: (1)
intentionality, or more specifically, the extent of a
defendant's intent with respect to the harm; (2) the nature
or gravity of the harm; (3) the dangerousness of defendant's
acts, or in other words, the reasonable expectation of harm;
and (4) the legitimacy of the defendant's act under
particular circumstances.55  In this theory, the fourth
dimension is the defendant's motive. According to Gross,
an act must be culpable in all four dimensions in order for
that act to be morally culpable at all.5 6 If what a defendant
53. See George K. Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the
United States, 33 B.U. L. Rev. 176, 193 (1953) ("The essence of punishment for
moral delinquency lies in the criminal conviction itself.... It is the expression of
the community's hatred, fear, or contempt for the convict which alone
characterizes physical hardship as punishment."). Henry Hart has defined a
crime as "[c]onduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal
and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community." Henry
M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 402-
06 (1958).
54. The phrase moral intuitions was suggested to me by Professor Brian
Tamanaha.
55. Gross, supra note 12, at 77-82.
56. Id. at 81 ("Just as there are no physical objects with only one dimension or
two, so an act with only one, two, or three dimensions of culpability is not a
culpable act at all. Culpable acts of less than four dimensions are like tables with
length alone, or with length and width, but no height.").
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did, on balance, was the right or legitimate thing to do,
then the act is not morally culpable. 7
To demonstrate the validity of Gross's theory, consider
the pairing of two appellate opinions on willful,
premeditated, and deliberate murder by Professor Joshua
Dressler in his casebook.58 The first case describes the
death of Ronnie Midgett, Jr., an eight-year-old boy, from a
beating by his intoxicated father. 9 This boy had been
brutally beaten over a substantial period of time and was
very poorly nourished and underdeveloped. ° The Supreme
Court of Arkansas upheld the conviction for intentional
murder based on the father's intent to cause serious
physical injury to his son.6 1 A factual inverse, the second
case deals with a defendant who shoots and kills his
terminally ill elderly father, Clyde Forrest, during a visit to
see him at the hospital.2 In his statements to the police
the defendant said the following: "I killed my daddy." "He
won't have to suffer anymore." "I promised my dad I
wouldn't let him suffer."5 In this case, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina affirmed his conviction for intentional
murder based on sufficient evidence of intent to kill,
premeditation, and deliberation.' The purposeful pairing
is both clever and provocative. Without fail, it disturbs
students because two vastly different killings are
considered the same offense of intentional murder under
the common law. Despite the explanation that both
defendants possessed the necessary intent or mens rea
required, some students inevitably protest the miscarriage
of justice.65 After all, isn't the criminal law supposed to be
57. See id.
58. Joshua Dressier, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law 249-56 (3d ed.
2003).
59. See Midgett v. State, 729 S.W.2d 410 (Ark. 1987).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. State v. Forrest, 362 S.E.2d 252 (N.C. 1987).
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See Dressler, supra note 58, at 255 n.3 (featuring the limericks of inspired
law students who agreed and disagreed with the results in the two cases).
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about moral condemnation? How could a son who acts out
of love for his father be regarded as the moral equivalent of
a despicable child abuser?
The point of these first year law students is not lost. If
the criminal law is to reflect the moral judgment of a
community, and if members of this community strongly
consider a defendant's motive in assessing morality, then
shouldn't the criminal law do so as well? Douglas Husak
points to other important micro-communities in our
everyday lives that include motive in their deliberations.
"Nothing written by moral philosophers supports the
unimportance of motive. It is doubtful that this feature of
criminal theory is reproduced in other institutions in which
rules are enforced, judgments rendered, and sanctions
imposed. Schools, places of employment, and families all
regard motive as crucial. Why should the criminal law do
otherwise?"66
Consideration of motive is necessary to avoid the
criminal law from becoming "a sterile exercise hinging guilt
on descriptive states of mind without regard to claims of
absent or mitigated moral blame."7  Even more
importantly, motive must be part of the criminal law in
order to ensure greater adherence to the rule of law. Only
through an alignment of social and legal norms can the
criminal law truly achieve effective social control.6
It is important to note that the inclusion of motive as
an essential consideration in the criminal law does not
threaten the exclusion of other relevant factors. Gross's
other three dimensions-intentionality, dangerousness,
harm-and even other factors such as voluntariness should
continue as prerequisites for moral culpability. Indeed,
motive and these other factors may have complicating
impacts on each other. As Gross explains, "the likelihood of
harm may be affected by the actor's motive, and the same
act done with one motive may be less dangerous than if
66. Douglas N. Husak, Philosophy of Criminal Law 144 (1987).
67. Gardner, supra note 13, at 742.
68. See Meares, supra note 39, at 582.
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done with another."69 Thus, motive is important on its own
but also for its effects on the other three dimensions of
moral culpability.
The current use of motive in the criminal law, while
good, is not good enough. The criminal law needs to take
motive into account in a more systematic and regular
fashion. Only through a comprehensive inclusion of motive
will the criminal law be a reflection of our moral intuitions.
This reflection is essential to a just and equal rule of law.
F. A Workable Framework for Motive
A systematic inclusion of motive would be a vast
improvement on current practices. However, as defenders
of the maxim have expressed, there are concerns with
effective social control and institutional competence. Thus,
there is a need for a creative framework with thoughtful
guidelines on how best to accommodate motive. This
article suggests the following: (1) the use of multiple
forums; (2) the assessment of each motive's provability and
moral potency; and (3) a reform of our attitudes.
1. The Use of Multiple Forums
Concerns about effective social control and
institutional competence can be met in a system where
motive, good and bad, does not simply lead to extreme
declarations of guilt or no guilt. The underlying
assumption of both concerns is that motive can only affect
critical decisions of liability. Because the stakes are fixed
at such a high level, it is not practicable to have courts
accommodating every sympathetic motive. Thus, the
current criminal law opts to have legislatures determine
only a few select motives that will enable defendants to
escape criminal liability. Instead, the criminal law should
allow motive a more prominent voice but not only in high-
stakes questions of liability. Motive should also figure in
69. Gross, supra note 12, at 104-05.
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other determinations such as sentencing, prosecutorial
charging, and plea bargaining decisions. A decision maker,
whether she is a prosecutor, a judge, a legislator, or a juror,
should be free to consider a defendant's motive. As a
result, some considerations of motive may not lead to
avoidance of liability but instead may only mitigate or
reduce a potential charge or sentence.
While these determinations are still critical for an
individual defendant, the implications of sentencing and
prosecutorial decisions are less consequential than liability
decisions on a systemic level. This is particularly true with
regard to the criminal law's all-important function as the
moral arbiter of a community.7 ° As Professor Kaufman
astutely noted, "mitigating sentences or declining to
prosecute does not send the same social message of
approval of violations of the law." By allowing for
multiple forums, the criminal law will still be able to
provide effective social control while also reflecting more
honest collective moral judgment.
Indeed, one of the collateral benefits of a multiple
forum system is the ability to react to motives that had not
been anticipated by legislation and yet can be considered in
other decisions such as plea bargaining or charging or
sentencing. For example, legislatures are only now
seriously contemplating the motive of euthanasia in
criminal statutes. Prior to this, there was a long period of
time in which many decision makers from judges to juries
wanted to accommodate euthanasia but were handicapped
by the gap in the law. Instead, during this interim time, a
multiple forum system would allow decision makers to
accommodate "new" or unique motives in less systemic,
discretionary stages such as plea bargaining and
sentencing.
This proposal of multiple forums for the consideration of
motive builds on what already exists in our current criminal
justice system. As stated earlier, in some limited instances
70. See Kaufman, supra note 9, at 333.
71. Id.
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such as self-defense or specific intent crimes, motive is
already the pivotal factor determining liability.72 In
addition, motive has traditionally figured into the
sentencing decisions of judges and the charging decisions of
prosecutors.73 According to Professor LaFave, "the existence
of a good motive on the part of the guilty person may be
taken into account wherever there is room for the exercise of
discretion .... .74 Such room can be found in the arrest
decisions of police officers, charging and plea bargaining
decisions of prosecutors, sentencing decisions of judges, and
even in post-sentencing matters of corrections officials,
parole boards and probation departments.7 5 This proposal is
different from current practices in that it espouses explicit
and direct considerations of motive.
This multiple forum approach is unlike the argument
numerous scholars have had over choosing a single best
forum for the consideration of motive. Some have pointed
to sentencing as that forum. Professor Husak vigorously
denounces such a practice as unprincipled. If a defendant's
motive does not fit within the narrow categories that have
long been recognized by traditional criminal law as bases
for avoiding liability, the defendant is "then forced to resort
to... 'unprincipled' means of evading liability, by relying
on prosecutorial discretion or on such judicial 'charades' as
manipulating the distinction between action and omission
in order to reach the desired result.'"6
In contrast, Professor Gardner contends that
sentencing is the proper place for consideration of motive
for two reasons. First, sentencing avoids the danger of
undermining the principle of legality: "Whatever actual
punishment is ultimately applied, the offender knows well
in advance of sentencing that it can be avoided simply by
72. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
73. See Kaufman, supra note 9, at 330 ("[T]he criminal law does not depart
from morality so as to ignore motive altogether. Motive is relevant at the
prosecutorial and sentencing stages.").
74. LaFave, supra note 19, § 5.3(b), at 260.
75. See id.
76. Kaufman, supra note 9, at 331-32 (describing Husak's critique of how the
criminal law currently handles euthanasia).
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not committing the criminal act."7 7 Secondly, assessing a
defendant's motive during sentencing is less distracting:
"[0]nce the fact finder determines guilt, inquiry into
offender motivation poses no risk of diverting attention
from whether the offender committed the crime to
digressions into why he might have done so."78
However, Gardner's position is not convincing. His
first point about legality presumes that any criminal
offense or defense that incorporates a particular motive as
an element cannot be expressed with sufficient
particularity and clarity. Although there is admittedly
greater risk of legality problems with liability
determinations than with sentencing, examples like self-
defense and burglary demonstrate that such risk can be
overcome. A very long history of development in the
common law and in statutes has led to extremely precise
and clear formulations. 79  Besides, motive is not more
susceptible to legality problems than other sophisticated
concepts such as accomplice or attempt liability. Even
more compelling is the argument advanced by Husak that
if certain motives are relatively more blameworthy than
other motives, such differences should be publicly
announced through legislation and not hidden in
sentencing:
The incorporation of motives into the substantive criminal
law would publicize whatever significance motives are
thought to have. For example, if an assault motivated by
racial hatred is believed to be more reprehensible than an
assault motivated by sexual jealousy, this judgment should
be explicitly included in a criminal code. A properly drafted
criminal code should provide effective notice. Statutes not
only should identify objectionable conduct, but also should
77. Gardner, supra note 13, at 748-49.
78. Id. at 748.
79. See, e.g. N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(b) (2005) ("A person may not use
deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in
subdivision one unless. . . he or she reasonably believes that such other person is
committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal
sexual act or robbery.").
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draw whatever distinctions are necessary to indicate the
extent to which conduct is blameworthy. The public is less
likely to be informed of the relevance of such judgments as
long as the evaluation of motives is reserved to the less
visible decision of sentencing authorities."0
Advance notice, after all, is exactly what the principle of
legality is all about.
As for Gardner's second concern, in his view motive is
only a distraction because he defines it to be so. 81 He
presumes that a determination of guilt does not involve
considerations of why a defendant acted. Rather than
being an independent reason to keep motive in sentencing,
this concern about distraction illustrates a basic point of
disagreement. Whereas Gardner regards motive as
distracting, the proposed multiple forum approach is based
on the premise that motive is of central importance in
determining moral culpability.
The moral intuitions which include a consideration of
motive are important in all phases of the criminal justice
process. Thus, motive belongs not just in sentencing or just
at trial but rather wherever moral judgment is required. It
should shape the decisions of prosecutors, judges, juries,
law enforcement officers, and legislatures at all phases of
criminal justice from beginning to end.
2. An Assessment of Provability and Moral Potency
The framework of multiple forums builds on the
current criminal justice system that already employs
multiple forums.8 2 However, what the current system lacks
is a guide to what may be the most appropriate forum for
any one particular case. As Professor Husak remarks:
Why are such issues as whether the defendant succeeds in
killing his victim, as opposed to failing in his attempt,
80. Husak, supra note 8, at 4.
81. See supra note 78.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
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material to his liability but not to his punishment? Why are
such issues as his stress, economic background, ignorance of
law, inherited character, education, amount of temptation,
or degree of complicity in the offense, material to his
punishment but not to his liability? The writings of
orthodox criminal theorists provide no principled answers to
these questions.8 3
Equally absent is any helpful standard on when it makes
sense for legislators to include motive in their definitions of
criminal offenses or defenses.8 4 It is important to fill these
gaps because not every "action-initiator" is the same.85 Not
only are they different substantively, but they also vary in
two critical features. The first is provability and the second
is moral potency.
What is meant by provability? Provability refers to the
ability to identify a defendant's motive and the ability to
prove that motive beyond a reasonable doubt. These are
two distinct considerations. For example, it may be
difficult or even impossible in some cases to identify a
defendant's motive. While admittedly this article thus far
has discussed motive as if it were readily identifiable, one
social scientist, Jonathan Casper, points out that is not
often the case. Indeed, as he points out, sometimes a
defendant himself may not even know why he committed a
criminal act.8 Other times, a defendant may have more
83. Husak, supra note 8, at 3.
84. See Duff, supra note 32, at 175 ("[W]e must still ask whether there is a
principled distinction between those kinds of motive that legislatures can
properly make relevant to criminal liability (for some kinds of crime), and those
that they should not make relevant .... ).
85. See Husak, supra note 8, at 12 (concluding that much "remains to be
done... [including] identify[ing] the best or the worst motives [and] describ[ing]
the several conditions under which motives should be relevant to criminal
liability").
86. Jonathan D. Casper, American Criminal Justice: The Defendant's
Perspective 146 (1972). "The question of why some people engage in 'criminal'
behavior is one that has long plagued societies and students of behavior. Many
explanations and theories have been developed, none of which seem particularly
fulfilling. It is too much to expect that criminals themselves-when asked, 'Why
did you do it?'-will provide us with ready answers to the question. They, too, are
quite confused about why they behave as they do and would welcome an answer."
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than one identifiable motive. 7 This possible difficulty in
identifying a defendant's motive has led some criminal law
scholars to advise against the inclusion of motive in the
criminal law."'
In addition to the ability to be identified, there is the
question of whether motive can be proven or disproved
beyond a reasonable doubt. It is one thing to be able to
articulate or express what a defendant's motive may have
been but quite another thing to be able to prove that motive
in a court of law. Subject to the strict rules of evidence and
the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, this is not
necessarily an easy task. Because motive is a mental state
of a defendant, this task is based on drawing of inferences
based on common-sense interpretations of tangible
Id.
87. Professor LaFave highlights the complication of mixed motives. In such
cases, a defendant may have acted in order to satisfy more than one identifiable
motive. LaFave, supra note 19, § 5.3(a), at 259. If one motive provides a classic
defense such as self-defense, the criminal law currently will disregard the other
motives and will excuse the defendant's acts. Id. Picture an abused woman who
killed her batterer because he was about to rape her forcibly. Under New York's
self-defense rules, it does not matter that she also relished killing him because of
her desire to seek revenge so long as when she did so, she was in imminent
danger of being forcibly raped. See N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(b) (2005).
While these mixed motive scenarios are interesting, they do not present
any serious obstacles to provability. So long as a defense or a sentencing
guideline does not require that a good motive be the singular motive of a
defendant, the presence of additional motives should be of no particular
consequence. Interestingly, Professor LaFave uses the mixed motive situations
as an illustration of how the irrelevance maxim is somewhat true. LaFave, supra
note 19, § 5.3(a), at 259.
88. See, e.g. Kaufman, supra note 9, at 319.
[T]he law must exclude motives for the sake of an effective and practicable
system of criminal justice. Given the difficulty of identifying a person's
subjective motive for an action, it would complicate adjudication
tremendously to have to ask not only whether the person violated a
criminal statute but also whether his or her motive for doing so was a good
one.
Id.
[T]o know the motives of a defendant would, arguably, require a vastly
greater inquiry into the specifics of his or her character and his or her goals
than an inquiry into the intention involved in the specific act. Such a
psychological inquiry into the complexities of the question of character is to
be avoided where possible.
Id. at 320.
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evidence. Whether this task is doable will vary from case
to case. Some supporters of the status quo limitations on
motive have cited this varying ability to be proven as a
reason not to extend its role in the criminal law. For
instance, Professor Duff concludes that including motive as
a factor in liability determinations opens the possibility for
spurious claims and the convictions of innocent
defendants."9 Professor Kaufman agrees: "To allow such
consideration [of motive] into judicial decisions would open
a Pandora's box and create the possibility of jury or judicial
'nullification' of the criminal law, not to mention the
enormous increase in unpredictability that such practices
would no doubt create."90
However, the complications of proving motive and the
variance of success are similar to those presented in
proving or disproving the other all-important mental state
of mens rea. Indeed, anytime that the criminal law is
confronted with the task of judging a defendant's mental
state, provability will require serious attention because
mental states are simply not tangible and not transparent.
The possibility of spurious claims and wrongful convictions
is present with mens rea too. Yet, the criminal law has
deemed such risks acceptable in including mens rea in
almost all offenses and in limited inclusions of motive such
as burglary and self-defense. There is no reason to believe
that a broader inclusion of motive would invite
adjudicatory disaster. At times, there will be lots of
evidence to prove a defendant's motive beyond a reasonable
doubt; at other times, there will very little. Insufficient
proof of motive will lead to whatever necessary and
arguably just result. For example, if the prosecution is
unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant possessed the necessary inimical motive, then
the defendant will be acquitted. Likewise, if a defendant is
unable to prove that he did act out of duress, then he will
be convicted. Professors Duff and Kaufman9 fail to make
89. Duff, supra note 32, at 178.
90. Kaufman, supra note 9, at 320.
91. Professor Kaufman also worries about nullification of the criminal law,
6812005]
BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:653
the case that motive presents a particular vulnerability for
our adjudicatory process.
Provability encompasses both the ability to identify
and the ability to prove a defendant's motive. Certainly,
provability will differ from case to case. However, in
addition to variability among individual cases, certain
classes of motives and/or offenses may be easier or more
difficult to prove. For example, with a spontaneous
intentional homicide, there may be much evidence in the
moments immediately preceding the killing that reveal the
defendant's motive. A contrasting example is a hate crime
where an element of the offense is the racial animus of the
defendant. Depending on the surrounding community, it is
likely that politically incorrect expressions of racial animus
are unacceptable such that evidence of such animus is
largely concealed and difficult to gather.
Because each individual case and even whole
categories of crimes and motives may vary as to their
provability, the framework of multiple forums is
particularly sensible. Each forum has a distinct standard
of proof and therefore, certain forums may be more
appropriate than others for particular cases or types of
offenses and motives. For example, if self-defense motives
are relatively easy to prove, then it makes sense to allow
self-defense as a defense to liability. However, if
euthanasia is a motive that is more difficult to prove, then
arguably consideration of such a motive belongs in
sentencing. Traditionally, sentencing is subject to a lower
standard of proof and free from the evidentiary
considerations of trial. Likewise, charging and plea
bargaining decisions of prosecutors are less constricted.
In addition to the feature of provability, motives also
differ in terms of their moral potency. This article uses the
phrase moral potency to refer to the relevance that a motive
may have as a reflection of the moral character of a
defendant or his acts. This concept is borrowed from
but his concern rests on the flawed premise that motive is somehow irrelevant
and not part of the criminal law.
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Professor Duff.92 In the tragic story of Ronnie Midgett, Jr.,
his father's motive of relieving anger and stress by beating
his young son over a prolonged period of time has high
moral potency because it makes such a statement about his
reprehensible moral character.93 There is also high moral
potency in the case of the devoted son who shoots his
terminally ill father to death. Motivated by his love and
desire to spare his father any further physical suffering,
this defendant's motive demonstrates a good moral
character or at least the absence of a bad one.94
What attributes for the ability of a motive to reflect the
moral character of a defendant? In large part, moral
potency depends upon the vigor of the community stance on
any particular motive. For some motives, there may be
strong and unified collective opinions that such motives
deserve the full brunt of the criminal law. Such motives
include vengeance and greed. For other motives, there may
be equally strong and unified opinions that such motives
should not be punished criminally. Examples include fear
in the case of a duress defense or irrational anger in the
case of a heat of passion defense.95 Still other motives may
inspire disparate opinions from the community such that
there is a distinct lack of unanimity.96
The stronger and more unified the collective opinion is
of a particular motive, the more likely that motive will be
perceived as a statement about a defendant's moral
character. The inverse is also true. The more tepid and
divisive the community opinion is, the less likely that
motive will be regarded as an important statement.
92. See Duff, supra note 32, at 177-78 (suggesting that legally significant
motives be identified by asking what difference a motive may make to the moral
character of the action or actor).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
95. Heat of passion defenses are also sometimes called provocation defenses.
Interestingly, the current criminal law is ambivalent about the stage at which
provocation should be assessed. As Professor Husak noted, "[t]ypically,
provocation is pertinent to liability in the law of homicide, but is material only to
sentencing for all other offenses." Husak, supra note 8, at 3.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 275-77 (discussing the divided public
opinion about drug addictions of defendants).
20051 683
BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:653
Whether a motive has high or low moral potency is
important to consider as the criminal law seeks to be a just
assessment of moral culpability.
Once again, the framework of multiple forums is
particularly well suited. Because moral potency may vary,
it makes sense to have the freedom to consider motive at
different stages in the criminal justice process. If a motive
has high moral potency, then it should be included in
decisions about criminal liability. It may even be
determinative of such decisions. As Professor Husak
suggests, it may even be prudent in some circumstances to
include such a motive in the definition of the criminal
offense.97 Because modern sentencing occurs within narrow
guidelines, there is too little room within any one
sentencing range to capture the high moral potency of such
a motive.95 On the other hand, if a community is undecided
on the morality of a particular motive, then the low moral
potency means that consideration of such motive should
either be inconsequential or perhaps be limited to
sentencing or plea bargaining decisions.
3. A Change in Attitude
The final recommendation is a sweeping reform of the
attitude towards motive in the criminal law. Far from
being irrelevant to the criminal law, it is essential. Just as
every legislator designing a new statute and every judge
confronting a new criminal case immediately thinks about
a defendant's mens rea, so too should criminal decision
makers consider a defendant's motive. No longer should
prosecutors, judges, and jurists be afraid of or admonished
from considering motives in their numerous decisions.
97. See Husak, supra note 8, at 4 (suggesting that the "most obvious means to
differentiate between the conduct" of a husband who kills his incurable wife and a
hired assassin who kills for money "is to incorporate reference to motives into
their respective offenses").
98. See id. (if the husband and hired assassin described in the footnote above
are convicted of the same offense, "[n]o sentencing guidelines can realistically
hope to correct the injustice that results .... ").
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Instead, there should be a public about-face in declaring
motive relevant to the criminal law.
Instead of allowing only a few select motives to
influence criminal liability, there should be consideration of
many more motives. Such consideration does not
necessarily need to lead to a different substantive outcome,
whether in liability or punishment. The influence of
motive will not be the same for every case. For some
motives, especially those that present difficult proof
problems or low moral potency, consideration may have no
impact and for a good reason. The goal of this final reform
is not necessarily any particular substantive result such as
the adoption of a euthanasia or drug addiction defense.
Rather, this article seeks to revolutionize the basic attitude
surrounding motive. What is important is a universal
inclusion of and appreciation for motive in the criminal
law. Generations from now, the hope is that a scholar of
criminal law will find it perplexing why Jerome Hall would
ever have declared motive irrelevant. Instead, the scholar
should be studying a criminal law that openly and honestly
considers the motives of defendants.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF MOTIVE IN THE SIMPLE STREET
SALE
Failure of the current criminal law to appreciate the
significance of motives for the moral blameworthiness of
defendants has had unfortunate consequences. Among
them has been the failure to develop ways to consider
motive without undermining other important concerns like
effective social control, legality, and institutional
competence. In part I, this article hoped to overcome these
failures by advocating for the freedom to consider motive at
multiple stages of the criminal justice process. Guided by
an appreciation of how motives can differ in their
provability and in their moral potency, this use of multiple
stages can be an effective first step in enhancing the role of
motive in the criminal law.
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Part II of this article focuses not on proposals or
recommendations but rather on an example of how the
current criminal law has turned to legal fictions to
compensate for its missteps regarding motive. Many
scholars recently have located their discussions of motive
within larger contexts of modern legal developments such
as hate crimes or euthanasia. These developments lend
easily to studies of how particularly good or bad motives
may warrant special treatment under the law. However,
this article looks at a less obvious challenge to motive and
that is the simple street sale of illegal drugs. What effect,
if any, should the motives of each participant in the sale
have on their liability or punishment?
Part II discusses the simple street sale and the agency
defense in four sections. The first section focuses on the
challenge of criminalizing the simple street sale. The
agency defense was formulated to answer this challenge.
In the second section, the article describes the historical
origins of the agency defense. The third section explains
the legal concept of agency, and the final section details the
inconsistencies and problems with applying the agency
defense to real cases.
A. Understanding the Challenge
The opening narrative is a classic example of a
narcotics street transaction. Recall that the buyer was
actually an undercover federal drug agent posing as a drug
addict. He approached the defendant, a stranger to him,
for help in attaining drugs. The defendant agreed, took
money from the agent, went into a hotel, bought drugs from
a third individual inside the hotel, emerged with the
requested drugs, and handed them to the agent.
Who should be punished under the criminal law? For
what crimes? What should their relative punishments be?
The easiest of the three participants in the street trade is
the person inside the hotel. Presumably a profiteer in the
distribution chain of narcotic drugs, this individual is
financially motivated. He makes a particularly good living
686
2005] THE CHALLENGE OF MOTIVE 687
due to the illicit nature of the drug trade. There is little to
no hesitation in condemning the profiteer's actions as
criminal." More notable and controversial are the political
choices to classify the sale of narcotic drugs as very serious
felonies and to impose lengthy jail sentences. °° ("their
crimes"-who is this statement made in reference to?)
In contrast, the ultimate buyer'0 1 presents more
difficult questions for motive and moral culpability.
Because such individuals are the actual consumers of the
illicit drugs, collectively they contribute to the wildly
lucrative nature of the drug trade. Without ultimate
buyers, there would be no insatiable, pent-up demand and
hence no trade. In this way, if the social harm is regarded
as the mere existence of the drug trade itself, then the
ultimate buyer should certainly be criminally responsible.
The more vexing problem is the motive of the ultimate
buyer. As implied by the word addict, the motive for the
participation of the ultimate buyer may be purely
biological. 1°2 Addicts purchase and use drugs at least in
part to avoid the terrible pains of withdrawal. Arguably,
99. Doing crime to make money has traditionally been regarded as morally
culpable. While there may be a real need to make money, effective social control
requires the criminal law to encourage lawful livelihoods and to punish unlawful
ones. Interestingly, this desire to make money may not always be the
determining factor in assessing the morality of a defendant's actions. For some,
what may be more relevant is the reason why the defendant wants to make
money. For example, if a destitute parent picks the pocket of an unsuspecting
victim to get money for food for her hungry children, then her act may be morally
excusable to some. For others, what may be morally relevant is whether a
defendant has a real choice between an honest living and selling drugs. For
others still, neither of these two considerations justify nor excuse the defendant's
acts.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 243-59.
101. See supra note 14.
102. See Anahad O'Connor, New Ways to Loosen Addiction's Grip, N.Y. Times,
Aug, 3, 2004, at Fl ("Researchers have known for some time that all substances of
abuse, including nicotine, alcohol, cocaine, marijuana and heroin, activate the
same pleasure pathway in the brain. But they are now finding that many drugs
cause subtle changes in brain activity that remain for weeks, months or years.
Such alterations, studies have found, help unleash the cravings that can plunge
recovered users back into the throes of addiction long after their last puff or
snort.").
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there is little to no morally culpable choice involved. 03 This
is the basis for the addiction defense. 10 4
However, on the initial occasions an addict tries drugs,
the motive is not biological. Instead, those initial acts may
be attributed to more of the usual variety of motives
punished under the criminal law. 05 Additionally, some
drug addicts do not limit their behavior to participation in
simple street sales; instead, they escalate to more serious
felonies such as robbery, burglary, and extortion in order to
support their drug habits. 0  For both these reasons,
numerous jurisdictions choose not to exempt the ultimate
buyer completely from criminal liability and therefore
reject the addiction defense.
This decision to impose criminal liability on the
ultimate buyer leads to the next challenge of defining their
offense and the appropriate punishment. One option is to
treat all participants in the simple street sale the same as
drug dealers. Thus, in the narrative, if the person inside
the hotel is charged with sale and sentenced to lengthy jail
time, then the buyer would be too. The theory of the
prosecution would be that the buyer is an accomplice of the
person inside the hotel. 0 Such suggestion may at first
seem preposterous but consideration of the elements of
accomplice liability lends some plausibility.0 8
103. See id. ("Although experts acknowledge that drug abuse begins as a
voluntary behavior, many argue that at some point a perilous line is crossed.
Brain cells that are repeatedly assaulted by addictive drugs change shape. The
brain's reward pathway-the same, primitive system that by evolutionary design
makes basic drives like sex and eating pleasurable-is highjacked. The urge to
get high is insatiable. In experiments, lab animals will press a lever for cocaine
until it kills them.").
104. See infra text accompanying notes 262-75.
105. See Paul Robinson, Criminal Defenses § 194(e), at 457 (1984).
106. See Bruce D. Johnson, Taking Care of Business 45-48 (1985).
107. See also infra text accompanying note 111 and note 111.
108. An act of assistance or encouragement is readily satisfied by the buyer's
acts of requesting, paying for, and ultimately receiving the drugs. Such acts are
not only helpful but also necessary for the seller to be guilty of sale. Furthermore,
the intent of the buyer is certainly to help the seller and to complete the sale.
Thus, the technical elements of accomplice liability exist. For detailed discussion
of the elements of accomplice liability, see infra text accompanying notes 172-76.
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What remains open is the normative question of
whether it is fair and just to punish the buyer and the
seller equally,19 especially in light of the serious jail time
that accompanies sale or distribution offenses. Because of
the biological motive that may underlie the conduct of
buyers, many legislatures decline this option to treat those
individuals as equally culpable as sellers. Still wanting to
hold ultimate buyers criminally liable, legislatures turn to
a second option that classifies the behavior as the lesser
offense of possession of drugs. Usually, the punishment for
such an offense pales in comparison to the felony sale of
drugs.10  This option condemns the behavior of the
ultimate buyer as criminal but also recognizes that their
moral culpability may be significantly lower than that of a
drug dealer.
By defining their offense as the unlawful possession of
drugs, this option disregards any role the buyer may have
had in the sale of the drugs. The buyer of illicit drugs is
exempt from an otherwise apt application of accomplice
liability. Professor LaFave explains that accomplice
doctrine does not apply "where the crime is so defined that
participation by another is inevitably incident to its
commission.... [because] the legislature, by specifying the
kind of individual who was guilty when involved in a
transaction necessarily involving two or more parties, must
have intended to leave the participation by the others
unpunished.""1 A conscious separation between the seller
inside the hotel and the ultimate buyer in terms of their
offenses and penalties marks the sale and possession
approach to criminalizing the simple street sale." 2 It is
within the context of this approach that the agency defense
was born.
109. See id.
110. See supra note 16.
111. LaFave, supra note 19, § 13.2(e), at 693.
112. For a long time, this was the approach used in most states including New
York; over time, through the various reforms of the war on drugs, it has been
replaced by the distribution approach. See infra text accompanying notes 143-51.
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Once jurisdictions adopt the sale and possession
approach to criminalizing the simple street sale, there still
remains the most difficult of the three participants: the
steerer. Given the condemnation of the other two
participants, jurisdictions easily decide to prosecute the
steerer too. After all, the conduct of the steerer is
indispensable to that final stage of distribution, the simple
street sale. Without it, the seller and the ultimate buyer
would not be able to conduct their transaction, at least not
in the same way. Perhaps some sellers would even be
deterred from engaging in the drug business if they had to
expose themselves directly to buyers and be more
vulnerable to law enforcement. 13  So, again, if the social
harm is minimally the illicit drug trade itself, then the
steerer should be criminally liable.
However, the task of defining the precise offense of the
steerer is still hard. Using the facts of the narrative again,
should the steerer defendant be charged with felony sale?
How about misdemeanor possession? Or should he face a
third offense that is entirely distinct from sale and
possession? 4 The first option of charging sale is interesting
because the theory of the prosecution could be that the
defendant was both a principal and an accomplice. If sale is
defined broadly to include any transfer of drugs,"5 the
steerer is guilty himself because he handed the drugs
himself to the undercover officer. 116 In addition, his acts also
qualify as intentional assistance to the person inside the
hotel, and thus he can also be prosecuted as an accomplice to
the seller. Likewise, the steerer may be charged with
possession as an accomplice to the buyer, or if he handles
the drugs himself, with possession as a principal."7
113. See infra text accompanying notes 238-39.
114. This article poses these questions in the disjunctive, but it is equally valid
and plausible that a steerer faces both sale and possession charges. Any
combination with even a third type of offense is possible.
115. See N.Y. Penal Law § 220.00(1) (2005).
116. In the lingo of the drug trade, this act of accepting money from the
ultimate buyer and then handing the drugs to him is known as doing a "hand-to-
hand." Not all steerers do the hand-to-hand in a transaction.
117. Any theory that relies on accomplice liability requires both an act of
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Is the steerer assisting, and therefore an accomplice of,
the ultimate buyer or of the seller? Because prosecutions
generally use the same charges against the principal and
his/her accomplice, 1 ' the answer to this question becomes
intertwined with whether the steerer should face sale or
possession charges. Thus, we arrive back where we began,
at the same question of offense definition for the steerer.
Should steerers be punished as lightly as buyers or as
severely as sellers? What is their relative level of moral
assistance and a dual mental state consisting of intent to assist and the mental
state that is mandated by the statute defining the crime committed by the
principal. For most steerers, the act element is easily met. Sending or
introducing a customer to a drug dealer or pointing out the location of the drug
dealer to inquiring customers would constitute an act of assistance or
encouragement. See United States v. Winston, 687 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1982);
State v. Gladstone, 474 P.2d 274 (Wash. 1970).
The element that poses a greater complication, though, is the dual mental
state. In most circumstances, the steerers who walk customers to the locations of
drug dealers or make personal introductions do so with the purpose of assisting.
In many instances, the steerers do so with the clear intent of making the sales
transaction happen. What is less obvious, though, is the identity of the principal
the steerer is assisting. Presumed in accomplice doctrine is the fact that the
accomplice is assisting a particular principal.
118. On occasion, there are exceptions to this rule of charging both principal
and accomplice with the same crime. There is no formal prohibition to convicting
an accomplice of a lesser offense or degree of offense than is proven against the
principal. See Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law § 30.06(C), at 484
(3d ed. 2001). Additionally, some courts have recognized the converse of
convicting an accomplice of a more serious offense or degree of offense than the
principal as acceptable. See State v. Bridges, 604 A.2d 131, 145 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1992); see also Oates v. State, 627 A.2d 555, 558-59 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1993).
Is it possible then to regard the steerer only as an accomplice to the buyer,
but then still charge the principal buyer with possession while charging the
accomplice steerer with sale? The short answer is no. The reasoning of
permitting different charges against principal and accomplice is that the liability
of each participant in a crime should depend on his/her own state of mind and not
on that of any other participant. See Bridges, 604 A.2d at 145. Usually in these
instances, though, the difference between the charges against accomplice and
principal are a matter of degree of mental state, and not a matter of substance.
For example, an accomplice may face charges of voluntary manslaughter while
the principal may face charges of murder. These offenses at a minimum are
based on the same physical act and the same criminal result of the death of
another human being. In contrast, while the sale and possession charges in our
street trade may involve the same illegal substance, they essentially focus on
different physical acts relating to that illegal substance and on distinctive harms
to society.
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culpability? This depends in part on their motive.
Biological addiction and profiteering are once again
considerations, as many steerers are drug addicts
themselves as well as profiteers in the distribution chain of
drugs. The complication is that both motives are present at
once. Steerers who are drug addicts need to make money
by steering drugs to support their drug habits. 119
The relative level of their moral culpability can be
viewed in two ways. On the one hand, the biological
addiction behind the need for money may justify their
participation in the drug trade. In other words, their end
justifies their means. The act of steering to satisfy a drug
habit is less morally culpable than the acts of steering or
selling for money generally. Thus, steerers should not be
charged with a sale offense or should at least receive a
lesser punishment. On the other hand, there are other
drug addicts who manage to make money to support their
habits through lawful livelihoods. The criminal law should
reflect the greater immorality of the steerer's choice to
support his drug habit through an unlawful activity.
Steerers should not face a mere possession charge alone, as
if his crime is the same as any other drug addict. Because
steerers choose to work in the illegal drug business, as
opposed to some legal activity, their morally culpable
profiteering motive overshadows their biological addiction.
They should face more serious charges than ultimate
buyers.
For most jurisdictions, this second viewpoint prevails.
The morally culpable profiteering motive overshadows the
119. In fact, steerers are often paid in both drugs and money for their services.
One study even observed that drug dealers preferred to pay their steerers with
both money and drugs and not just money alone. See Johnson, supra note 106, at
71.
Interestingly, this same study discovered that some steerers do not consider
themselves dealing drugs. Instead, they regard their payments with drugs as
"getting over," whereby addicts get drugs without paying by doing favors for drug
dealers. Many heroin users do a variety of favors as ways to "get over." For
instance, they will steer, tout, cop, hold drugs, test drugs, lend works, pick up
drugs, and run shooting galleries. Despite the breadth and necessity of their
services, they do not regard themselves as drug dealers. See id. at 4.
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biological addiction, and as a result, steerers face the same
serious charges as the sellers. Charged with serious sale
felonies and facing lengthy jail sentences, a steerer has a
real incentive to be both creative and bold in mounting a
successful defense. Some find a legal solution in the agency
defense. The next sections describe the history and origins
of the agency defense in narcotics sales prosecutions.
B. The History of the Agency Defense
America's drug problem first reached national
proportions in the 1960s when many Americans
experimented with powerful drugs amidst the liberal
politics of the feminist, civil rights, and anti-Vietnam War
movements.
Seemingly overnight, millions of young people started using
illegal drugs, many of them children of the middle class. 2 '
However, everything changed when the illicit-drug
commerce appeared to spread beyond the Mafia's traditional
market: poor minorities. Beginning in the 1960s, the crimes
that had long plagued inner cities began to creep into the
suburbs. Worse, the children of the suburbs began to
express an interest in drugs.'21
When Nixon became president, in 1969, the nation was in
the grip of a raging heroin epidemic.'22
Relatively safe and enjoyable experiences with
marijuana led many to try other more dangerous drugs like
LSD, cocaine, and heroin. 123 Concomitantly, there was a
120. Mathea Falco, The Making of a Drug-Free America 21 (1998).
121. Steven B. Duke & Albert C. Gross, America's Longest War: Rethinking
Our Tragic Crusade against Drugs 100 (1993).
122. Massing, supra note 2, at 13.
123. See id. at 22. "During the late 1960s and 1970s, a sizable proportion of the
generation born after World War II developed favorable attitudes toward the use
of some illicit drugs. In 1979, 68.2 percent of eighteen-to-twenty-five year-olds
admitted to government surveyors that they had used marijuana or hashish at
least once, and 27.5 percent of that age group admitted having used cocaine."
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frightening explosion in crime throughout the country. In
the mid-1960s, property crime and violent crime began to
rise dramatically and would continue to do so through the
early 1990s." 4
As a result of their historical growth together, drug
abuse and crime have long been associated in the minds of
Americans. 125 Indeed, politicians and their strategists have
seized upon this association, exaggerated and
manufactured statistics, and manipulated fears to their
advantage.' 21
Not surprisingly, the federal government and many
state governments enacted new penal laws, adopted more
aggressive policing tactics, created new agencies, and
poured significant amounts of money into their drug-
fighting efforts.' 27  For example, the federal drug
enforcement budget grew from $65 million in 1969 to $719
million in 1974.12' The war on drugs was in earnest, and all
of these efforts were focused on eliminating or at least
reducing the supply of drugs. 29
Duke & Gross, supra note 121, at 100 (quoting National Institute on Drug Abuse,
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Main Findings 1985 (1989)).
124. See Duke & Gross, supra note 121, at 104 ("Property-crime rates have
tripled since the mid-1960s, and violent crime rates have more than doubled ....
About 1985 ... near the crest of the cocaine epidemic, the rates resumed their
climb.").
125. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Signs of a Drug War Thaw; As Fear Eases,
Rockefeller Laws Seem Less Necessary, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 2001, at A29.
"According to a June 1971 Gallup poll, Americans considered drugs the nation's
third-most serious problem, behind Vietnam and the economy." Massing, supra
note 2, at 113 (quoting the June 1971 Gallup poll).
126. "[D]uring the heroin panic of Nixon's War on Drugs, junkies would be
blamed for stealing as much as fifteen times the value of everything stolen in the
United States." Baum, supra note 3, at 69-70 (describing numerous examples of
statements made by think tanks, government officials, and elected politicians
blaming heroin addicts for exaggerated dollar amounts of crime). For example, in
1972, "W[the conservative Hudson Institute estimated that New York City's
250,000 heroin addicts were responsible for a whopping $1.7 billion in crime,
which was well more than the total mount of crime in the nation." Id.
127. See generally Baum, supra note 3, passim.
128. See Baum, supra note 3, at 75.
129. Consider the following as an example of the supply side attitude, even in
the mid-1990s. "The focus of our effort was going to be on the source of the
problem: the drug dealer. We weren't going after the users. We would
systematically take out the low-level street dealer, the mid-level operator and
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Against this backdrop, in 1978, the New York State
Court of Appeals handed down a significant quartet of
cases that focused on the agency defense being raised in
narcotics sales prosecutions.130  The agency defense had
become confused in its use and required judicial detailing
of its exact parameters. The high court stepped up to the
challenge and tried to provide guidance to its lower courts.
In providing its guidelines, the court shed some light on
how the agency defense came to be in narcotics sale
prosecutions.
The first notable appellate opinion to address directly
the question of agency in the criminal sale of narcotics was
in 1954 in United States v. Sawyer.'13  This case supplied
the facts for the opening narrative of the article. At trial,
the District Court refused the defendant's request for the
jury to be instructed on the legal difference between acting
as a seller and acting as a procuring agent for the buyer. 132
On review, the Third Circuit agreed with the defendant's
request and, in reversing, stated that the trial court
should at least have pointed out to the jury that if they
believed that the federal agent asked the defendant to get
some heroin for him and thereupon the defendant undertook
to act in the prospective purchaser's behalf rather than his
own, and in so doing purchased the drug from a third person
with whom he was not associated in selling, and thereafter
delivered it to the buyer, the defendant would not be a seller
and could not be convicted under this indictment.133
high-level king pin." Massing, supra note 2, at 255 (quoting a description of
Operation Juggernaut in 1995 by former Commissioner of the New York City
Police Department, William Bratton, in his book Turnaround). See also Falco,
supra note 120, at 3-11.
130. See People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d 208 (N.Y. 1978); People v. Sierra, 379
N.E.2d 196 (N.Y. 1978); People v. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d 200 (N.Y. 1978);
People v. Argibay, 379 N.E.2d 191 (N.Y. 1978).
131. 210 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1954).
132. See id.
133. Id. at 170. Interestingly, the defendant also appealed on the ground that
the District Court erred by not instructing the jury on the defense of entrapment.
The Court of Appeals also agreed with defendant on this point. Sawyer, 210 F.2d
at 170-71.
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In Sawyer, some evidence suggests that the defendant
acted on the undercover federal agent's behalf and not on
his own behalf. At the time of the incident the defendant
was walking home from his job when he initially rejected
the agent's request for heroin, explaining that he did not do
that sort of thing. Undeterred, the agent approached the
defendant again, and this time, feigned a dramatic and
violent seizure from apparent withdrawal. He begged the
defendant to get him some heroin to relieve his distress.
Only then did the defendant take twenty dollars from the
agent, go inside a nearby hotel, buy heroin, and bring the
heroin back to the agent."'
While the Third Circuit may be correct in its
assessment of the evidence and the defendant's selfless
motive, what is less clear is the legal significance of such
motive. The Third Circuit stated that the distinction
between acting on the ultimate purchaser's behalf and
acting on the defendant's own behalf is "obvious" to trained
lawyers as the telltale difference between a seller and a
procuring agent. In contrast, the court worried that both
these distinctions are lost to lay jurors who thus need a
formal instruction from a trial judge.", On this ground, the
court reversed the conviction for the sale of narcotics and
remanded for a new trial.136 Other than its conclusion
about the relative knowledge of lawyers and lay jurors and
the need for a jury instruction, the Third Circuit did not
elaborate on the legal significance of these distinctions.
Instead, it glossed over exactly why or how a selfless
motive of the defendant deserved an acquittal of sale
charges.
Moreover, the Third Circuit cited no precedent to
support its critical introduction of the agency defense in a
case of narcotic sales. Perhaps the applicability and
analysis of the agency defense is so obvious to the Third
Circuit that it figured precedent is unnecessary. Hence,
134. See id. at 170.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 171.
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the agency defense was introduced to drug sales without
detailed explanation and without precedent.
The first New York case to recognize the agency
defense was People v. Buster in 1955.17 The intermediate
appellate court issued a very brief memorandum opinion
which stated that "[t]he People's evidence established
affirmatively that defendant acted in the transaction solely
as the agent of the prospective purchaser.""8 Because
"[there is nothing to show that the accused received any
benefit for bringing trade to the seller, or that the two were
associated in distributing narcotics," 139 the appellate court
cited to Sawyer and ruled that the trial court should not
have allowed the jury to consider the charge of attempted
sale of narcotics against the accused. 140  There were no
other facts or legal explanations offered in the opinion.
Once again, as with the federal experience, the agency
defense was introduced to New York without any helpful
reasoning.
Like New York, other federal circuits 4 ' and states4 2
also initially adopted the agency defense in their respective
137. People v. Buster, 145 N.Y.S.2d 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 1955). There
was an earlier New York narcotics case, People v. Pasquarello, in which the same
Fourth Department court indirectly relied upon the agency concept to dismiss the
defendant's appeal. 123 N.Y.S.2d 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 1953). There the
defendant protested lack of instruction to the jury on accomplice theory by the
trial court because he wanted the jury to consider the defense that he was an
accomplice to the buyer in the drug transaction. Id. at 406. The appellate court
disagreed, reasoning that since the buyer could not have been charged with sale
of narcotics and yet this defendant was, then the buyer and defendant could not
possibly have been accomplices. The court's reasoning is quite illogical and
assumes that the sale charge facing the defendant was legally correct without
addressing the defendant's point. Pasquarello's accomplice defense was actually
the agency defense in disguise. He wanted to be considered the buyer's agent
such that his liability would be limited to the liability of the buyer and therefore
would not include the sale charge. Because this opinion failed to discuss the
agency defense directly, it does not merit the designation of being the first New
York agency case; however, it was cited by the Buster court and hence is worth
explaining.
138. Buster, 145 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
139. Id.
140. See id. The opinion also cites to the Pasquarello opinion as precedent. See
supra note 137.
141. The First Circuit adopted the agency defense for the first time in 1970 in
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narcotics cases. However, in 1970 Congress single-
handedly undermined the expansion of the agency defense
by passing the landmark Controlled Substances Act."" In
reaction to the growing crisis in drug abuse throughout the
country, Congress dramatically changed its approach to the
criminalization of drugs.'4 Looking for a more effective
strategy against the booming illegal drug business,
Congress greatly expanded the scope of drug laws by
declaring it unlawful "for any person knowingly or
intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense,
a controlled substance."45 In direct response to the agency
defense, the term "distribute" was defined as
"deliver[ing] ... a controlled substance or a listed
chemical,"146 and the term "deliver" was further defined as
"the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a
controlled substance or a listed chemical, whether or not
there exists an agency relationship."47 Explicit within this
the case of United States v. Barcella and observed that the majority of its sister
circuits had already done so. United States v. Barcella, 432 F.2d 570, 571 (1st
Cir. 1970) (citing United States v. Winfield, 341 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1965) (dictum),
Myers v. United States, 337 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1964) (dictum), United States v.
Sizer, 292 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1961) (dictum), Vasquez v. United States, 290 F.2d
897 (9th Cir. 1961) (dictum), Kelley v. United States, 275 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
Adams v. United States, 220 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1955)).
142. See William Donnino & Anthony Girese, The Agency Defense in Drug
Cases, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 27, 1978, at 1 (such states included Texas, Kansas,
Pennsylvania, Nevada, Alabama, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Oklahoma). See
also People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d 208, 211 n.1 (N.Y. 1978) (citing to the clear
majority of sister States that had also adopted the agency defense by 1978 such as
Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Utah, Washington, Alaska, Arizona, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, and Wyoming, among others).
143. The sale and possession approach was repealed by the Act of October 27,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1101, and was replaced by the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse and Control Act of 1970. Title II of that statue is more popularly known as
the Controlled Substances Act. See Pub. L. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1242 (Oct. 27,
1970).
144. See Scott W. Parker, Note, An Argument for Preserving the Agency
Defense As Applied to Prosecutions for Unlawful Sale, Delivery, and Possession of
Drugs, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2649, 2662 (1998).
145. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2003).
146. 21 U.S.C. § 802(11) (2003).
147. 21 U.S.C. § 802(8) (2003) (emphasis added).
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new crime of distribution is an exclusion of the agency
defense.
Armed with this new powerful statute, prosecutors
began to charge defendants with distribution as opposed to
sale of controlled substances. As a result of the explicit
reference to the agency defense, federal courts uniformly
declared the defense inapplicable to distribution charges
and ended its short-lived presence in the federal narcotics
cases. 148
The passage of this remarkable new law by Congress
influenced many state legislatures to follow suit. Forty-
eight out of fifty states adopted the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act 149 in one form or another. Not all of them
included the expansive criminalization and definition of
"deliver," but some did. 50 Regardless of its exact form,
these new broad drug laws in the states led to the
inevitable demise of the agency defense in most state
courts as well.151
148. See, e.g. United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241, 1243 (8th Cir. 1973)
(holding that the new definitions of distribute and deliver eliminate the agency
defense); United States v. Miller, 483 F.2d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Hernandez, 480 F.2d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Pierce, 354 F.
Supp. 616, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1,
11-12 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Redwood, 492 F.2d 216, 216 (3d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217, 220-21 (2d Cir. 1973).
149. The Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1970 was modeled after the
federal Controlled Substances Act. See Unif. Controlled Substances Act
(amended 1994), 9 U.L.A. 645-50 pt. IV (1997).
150. See, e.g. Alaska Stat. § 11.71.900(6) (2003) (defining deliver as "the actual,
constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled
substance whether or not there is an agency relationship"); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 21a-240(11) (2003) (defining deliver as "the actual, constructive or attempted
transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not
there is an agency relationship"); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-401 (12) (2003) (indicating
that "[dieliver or delivery shall mean the actual, constructive, or attempted
transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not
there is an agency relationship"); 720 ll. Comp. Stat. Ann. 600/2(C) (2003)
(stating that -[d]eliver' or 'delivery' means the actual, constructive or attempted
transfer of possession, with or without consideration, whether or not there is an
agency relationship."); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:961(10) (2003) (defining deliver as
"the transfer of a controlled dangerous substance whether or not there exists an
agency relationship."); see also Parker, supra note 144, at 2664 n.93.
151. See Parker, supra note 144, at 2664-72, 2664 n.95 (describing the
expansion of state drug laws and the corresponding abandonment of the agency
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In contrast to its sister states, New York did not follow
the federal distribution approach. Instead of adopting this
new offense of distribution of narcotics, New York
continued to use its traditionally broad definition of sale to
capture any distributive acts.152 Even more notable is that
New York did not follow the federal lead in explicitly
excluding the agency defense through a statutory
definition. Rather, the New York legislature allowed this
judicially created defense to continue. 153  This legislative
inaction was noted in 1978 when the Court of Appeals of
New York addressed the agency defense in a bold attempt
to provide guidance and clarity to its trial courts. 54
C. The Concept of Agency
In order to grasp why the agency defense arose in
narcotics prosecutions, it is necessary to understand the
legal concept of agency and its similarities to and
differences from accomplice liability. Agency is not a
concept that originates with narcotics prosecutions or even
criminal law. As explained by a state court in Maine, the
agency concept is borrowed from commercial law. 115
defense while also discussing in detail the few states, such as Iowa and Alaska,
who still made room for the agency defense within the new drug laws). Since
1997, Iowa and Alaska too have given up on the agency defense. See State v.
Allen, 633 N.W.2d 752, 753 (Iowa 2001); State v. Burden, 948 P.2d 991, 994
(Alaska 1997).
152. See Allen, 633 N.W.2d at 756 ("Only New York's highest court appears to
recognize the continued viability of the procuring agent defense. The court of
appeals' view is premised, however, on a drug statute which retains the
distinction between buyers and sellers.. .. ")
153. "[Just as it has chosen to leave the act of buying drugs unprohibited by
the criminal law, the Legislature has also left the agency defense inviolate. Given
the accelerated and massive attention that the narcotics law have received within
the last decade, and the fact that our Legislature has chosen to punish drug
trafficking more severely than has any other jurisdiction, we must assume that
its acceptance of the defense represents a calculated and ameliorative judgment
not to impose such penalties upon a person who merely facilitates the acquisition
of drugs by a purchaser." Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 212.
154. See id.
155. State v. Mansir, 440 A.2d 6 (Me. 1981) (rejecting agency defense in
narcotics case because such defense would circumscribe the legislative intent of
drug laws "by the usage of concepts from the law of commerce").
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Expanding beyond its commercial law roots, the agency
concept now appears in a wide variety of areas of law
including torts15  and corporations. 57  There are two
important aspects to the concept of agency: the formation of
a principal-agent relationship and its implications.
How exactly is an agency relationship formed?
According to the Restatement (Second) of Agency, "[algency
is the fiduciary relation which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and
consent by the other so to act."158 This relationship will
only exist "if there has been a manifestation by the
principal to the agent that the agent may act on his
account, and consent by the agent so to act."159 An actual
belief of an alleged agent that he is an agent of the
principal is not sufficient. Such belief must be reasonable
and must be based upon some conduct of the principal that
indicates that the agent is so authorized to act in order to
create a legally cognizable agency relationship.6 0 It is the
conduct of both parties that is important to the formation of
Courts have also explained that since agency is originally a commercial law
concept, the principles governing its use in that original context may not strictly
apply to the criminal context. See, e.g. People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d 208, 211
(1978) ("Concededly, the introduction of the term 'agency' into the lexicon of the
law governing drug prosecutions at most carries with it limited application of
concepts which govern its use in defining relationships and responsibilities more
characteristic of the world of commerce and property.... Blunt
acknowledgement of that fact would lessen consequent confusion."); People v.
Argibay, 379 N.E.2d 191, 194 (N.Y. 1978) ("[Ilt would be ludicrous to apply
commercial law definitions to the criminal law.. . ."). Arguably, though, the ill fit
between commercial law concept and criminal law context should lead not to a
relaxed application of principles, but rather to a rejection of its adaptation at all.
156. In torts, the doctrine of respondeat superior imposes vicarious liability on
a master/employer for tortious acts committed by her servantlemployee if the
tortious acts occur within the scope of the employment relationship.
157. General rules of agency determine the power and obligations of corporate
officers in their dealings with outsiders. See Robbins v. Panitz, 463 N.E.2d 615
(1984) (held that because of the status as agent of corporation, corporate officer is
not personally liable for ending an employment contract unless such act
constitutes a separate tortious act).
158. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958).
159. Id. § 15.
160. Id. § 15, cmt. a.
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an agency relationship. The Restatement explains that
"[t]he principal must in some manner indicate that the
agent is to act for him, and the agent must act or agree to
act on the principal's behalf and subject to his control." 161
Interestingly, such a relationship can result whether
or not there is a contract between the principal and agent.
This is so because consideration is not necessary to form an
agency relationship. 1 2 The agent does not need to promise
to act on behalf of the principal and the principal does not
need to provide any compensation for the services of the
agent. 163  Instead, agency can simply "result from a
direction by a person to another to act on his
account .... "64 Of course, if there are such promises and
compensation and a contract results, agency can still be
born from a contractual arrangement. 6 5  Under such
circumstances, the law of contracts and agency would be
applicable.
The critical legal consequence of an agency
relationship is the power conferred upon an agent. An
agent has the power to alter the legal relationship between
his principal and other third persons. 66 For example, an
agent can contract to acquire property from a third person
in exchange for money. As a result of the agent's actions,
the principal would have a contractual obligation with that
third person. This type of agent is known as a buyer's
agent, a purchasing agent, or a procuring agent. He has
this power because he agreed with his principal that he
would act primarily for the benefit of the principal and not
for himself. 167
The primacy of the principal's benefit is at the core of
the fiduciary nature of the agency relationship.'6
161. Id. § 1, cmt. la.
162. Id. § 16.
163. Id. § 16, cmt. a.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. § 12.
167. Id. § 14K (explaining the difference between a buyer's agent and a
supplier).
168. Fiduciary relationships are a special breed of relationships in the law.
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[Ain agent employed to buy or to sell is subject to a duty to
the principal, within the limits set by the principal's
directions, to be loyal to the principal's interests and to use
reasonable care to obtain terms which best satisfy the
manifested purposes of the principal.169
Once the principal's benefit is subordinated to the self-
interest of an agent, then that alleged agent is not an agent
at all; instead, he is a supplier1 v0 or a non-agent
contractor.171  It is acceptable for an agent to have other
interests, including self-interests, but they must be
secondary to the principal's interest.
This classic concept of agency is remarkably similar to
the doctrine of accomplice liability in criminal law. Like
agency, accomplice liability is also concerned with two
particular parties: a principal and an accomplice. Like
agency, the end result of accomplice liability is the
imposition of liability on one person for the acts of another.
They both address the question of when the acts and words
of one person should create obligations and liability for
another person under the law. There is a slight difference
though. Agency, especially in non-criminal contexts such
as commercial law, typically leads to the imposition of
financial and other civil obligations upon the principal.
Accomplice liability results in moral condemnation and
criminal liability being imposed by an entire community on
an accomplice.172
Derived from Roman law, the term fiduciary refers to "[a] person who is required
to act for the benefit of another person on all matters within the scope of their
relationship; one who owes to another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence,
and candor." Black's Law Dictionary 658 (8th ed. 2004). Examples of fiduciaries,
other than agents, include trustees and estate administrators. See id.
169. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 424 (1958).
170. Id. § 14K (explaining the difference between a buyer's agent and a
supplier).
171. Id. § 14N, cmt. b ("A person who contracts to accomplish something for
another or to deliver something to another, but who is not acting as a fiduciary for
the other, is a non-agent contractor.").
172. Understandably then, traditional commercial agency analysis focuses on
objective evidence establishing whether a principal has so authorized and
empowered an agent to act on his behalf. Common manifestations of such
authority and empowerment are found in express agreements or in the status of
7032005]
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Even more important than this slight difference in
which party bears liability is the difference in the
prerequisites for legal status as an accomplice versus an
agent. Section 2.06 of the Model Penal Code defines an
accomplice as a person who is accountable for the crime
committed by another because he/she (a) gave assistance or
encouragement or failed to perform a legal duty to prevent
the crime (b) with the intent thereby to promote or
facilitate commission of the crime. 173
This intent element actually requires two distinct
mental states. First, "the accomplice must intend that his
acts have the effect of assisting or encouraging another. " 174
Second, "the accomplice must also have the mental state
required for the crime of which he is to be convicted on an
accomplice theory." v5 The accomplice's purpose must be to
encourage or assist another in the commission of a crime as
to which the accomplice also has the requisite mental
state.76 Unlike agency, there is no requirement that the
principal's interest be dominant.
The absence of this requirement reflects a subtle but
critical difference in the motives of accomplices and agents.
It is entirely acceptable for an accomplice's self-interest to
outweigh his intent to aid the principal, so long as he still
has such intent to aid and whatever other mens rea is
an agent as an officer of a corporation.
On the other hand, accomplice doctrine concerns itself primarily with the
subjective mental state of an alleged accomplice with respect to the crime at hand
and does not require an express association with the principal. Of course, it is
still required that accomplices do an act of assistance. What is not required is
that there be some prior understanding or arrangement, express or otherwise,
with the principal criminal actor. Such prior understandings or arrangements
are required for other types of multi-party offenses such as conspiracy or
solicitation, but they are not a necessary element of accomplice liability.
173. Model Penal Code § 2.06 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); LaFave, supra
note 19, §13.2, at 671 (4th ed. 2003). This modern formulation in the Model Penal
Code fairly represents the modern substantive rule of accomplice liability as
inherited from the common law. The common law's archaic and formalistic
classification of accomplices based upon the timing of their assistance relative to
the principal's criminal act has long been set aside. See id. at 670-71.
174. LaFave, supra note 19, § 13.2(c), at 676.
175. Id. § 13.2(c), at 676-77.
176. Id. §13.2(c), at 675.
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required by the offense itself. In other words, an
accomplice's own self-interest can be his motive or action-
initiator. For an agent, though, his motive must not be
self-interest. As a fiduciary, his action-initiator must be
the interests of his principal, above all else.
It is this critical difference between agency and
accomplice liability that accounts for the adoption of a
commercial law concept as a defense in a criminal narcotics
prosecution. After all, since accomplice liability also
establishes a particular relationship between two parties,
why did defense attorneys and judges feel the need to
borrow the agency concept from commercial law? Instead
of claiming status as the agent of the buyer, why didn't
they simply portray the steerer as an accomplice of the
buyer? The accomplice defense proves to be vulnerable and
ineffective. First, being an accomplice to the buyer does not
preclude being an accomplice to the seller. A steerer could
intend to aid both the buyer and the seller in a simple
street sale when he makes an introduction or does a hand-
to-hand transaction. Second, being an accomplice to the
buyer does not preclude being a principal for the offense of
sale. Thus, an accomplice defense does not foreclose
liability for the sale charges. Hence, the steerer defendant
turns to the agency defense.
Can a steerer claim to be a purchasing agent for the
ultimate buyer? An agency relationship that is formed to
have the agent carry out an illegal act on the principal's
behalf is in itself illegal. The Restatement (Second) of
Agency unequivocally states that "[tihe appointment of an
agent to do an act is illegal if an agreement to do such act
or the doing of the act itself would be criminal, tortious, or
otherwise opposed to public policy."'77 Declaring agency
appointments illegal may discourage their formation;
however, by no means does such a declaration ensure that
these illegal appointments will not be made. It is unlikely
that a principal and an agent who are already
contemplating a crime will be deterred by a rule declaring
177. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 19 (1958).
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their relationship a crime too. Wisely recognizing this, the
Restatement provides that while illegal, the agency
relationship is not considered ineffective. Through the
appointment of an agent to do a criminal act, the principal
is still liable as if she herself had done the criminal act
directly.7  Of course, the agent is criminally liable as well
since he is the one who actually commits the criminal act.'79
Although he may be liable for some offense, what the
steerer wants is protection specifically from the sale
charges. The Court of Appeals of New York in 1978 issued
a quartet of decisions that explains how the agency defense
offers that protection.S0  There are two distinct
explanations. First, since an agent is representing the
principal throughout the entire transaction, when the
steerer hands the drugs over to the ultimate buyer, the
steerer is merely giving to the ultimate buyer what the
ultimate buyer already owns. The physical exchange
between the steerer and the ultimate buyer does not
constitute an actual transfer since the steerer and the
ultimate buyer are agent and principal and constitute one
legal entity.
The underlying theorization is that a person, who acts solely
on behalf of the recipient of the drugs in a transaction,
performs as an extension of the recipient and cannot be
guilty of a sale, since that person is merely transferring to
178. Id. § 19, cmt. c (recognizing that vicarious liability imposed upon a
principal based upon an agency relationship would still be subject to the rules on
accomplice liability).
179. It is no defense that the agent committed this criminal act on the order of
a principal. "[Ilt is well settled that the command of a master to a servant, a
principal to an agent, or a parent to his child, will not justify a criminal act done
in pursuance therefore." Donnino & Girese, supra note 142, at 1 (citing 16 C.J.
Criminal Law § 56, at 87-88, and 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 39, at 129-30). "The
law does not recognize the doctrine of agency as a defense to a criminal charge. It
deals with the person who commits the overt act, and while others may be guilty
as accessories, the party committing the prohibited act is not permitted to
interpose the defense that he acted only as an agent or employee." Id. at 24
(quoting State v. Chauvin, 132 S.W. 243 (Mo. 1910)).
180. Explanations are not found in most of opinions applying the agency
defense. Like the court in Sawyer, perhaps courts assume that the reasons why
an agent cannot be liable of sales are obvious and do not require any detailing.
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the recipient that which the recipient already owns or that
to which he is entitled, there being no sale, exchange, gift or
disposal of the drugs to the recipient.'
Even the broad definition of sale in New York does not
include these exchanges between agent and principal.
Under New York law a person may be found guilty of selling
drugs when he gives them to another even though he has
received nothing in return.... Reading the statute
literally, any passing of drugs from one person to another
would constitute a sale .... However there are certain cases
where the defendant's mere delivery of the drugs does not
appear to involve the same degree of culpability, or warrant
the extreme penalties, associated with pushing drugs. For
instance, when a friend of the defendant gives him money
and asks him to purchase a small quantity of drugs the
defendant's delivery of the drugs to the buyer could be
considered a sale under a literal interpretation of the
statute although, as a practical matter, he was simply a
buyer who purchased the drugs on behalf of another. 8 2
The second explanation is that as a procuring agent for
the ultimate buyer, the steerer cannot be guilty of any
offense more serious than his principal. If the principal is
only guilty of misdemeanor drug possession, then the agent
can only be guilty of this same offense. Unlike the first
explanation, which assumes that the agent and principal
are one and the same legal entity, this second explanation
recognizes that the agent and principal are two separate
entities, but by virtue of their relationship, concludes that
these two entities should face the same criminal charge.
[Tihe underlying theory of the agency defense in drug cases
is that one who acts as procuring agent for the buyer alone
is a principal [as opposed to accomplice, not as opposed to
agent] or conspirator in the purchase rather than the sale of
181. People v. Sierra, 379 N.E.2d 196, 198-99 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that agency
is not a defense to charge of criminal possession of narcotics since possession,
unlike sale, does not depend upon notions of ownership or title).
182. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 205.
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the contraband.... [A]n individual who participates in
such a transaction solely to assist a buyer and only on his
behalf, incurs no greater criminal liability than does the
purchaser he aids and from whom his entire standing in the
transaction is derived."8 3
Although there are appreciable theoretical differences,
both explanations provide an agency defense for only
certain steerers. Not every steerer qualifies for the status
of an agent of the buyer.' Simply steering a buyer to the
seller is not enough to be considered an agent.185 He must
also be a mere extension of the buyer. Most importantly,
he must be motivated by a desire to advance the interests
of the ultimate buyer, rather than an independent desire to
promote the drug transaction. 8 6 For example, the steerer
must not be motivated by any expectations of profit for
himself. 187 The requisite dominance of the principal's
interest originates from the fiduciary nature of the
principal-agent relationship, as developed in traditional
commercial law. 88
The implication of this motive requirement is that an
agent of the ultimate buyer cannot also be an agent of the
seller. As the New York Court of Appeals explained in
People v. Roche, if a defendant "is in fact interested in the
outcome,.., by an agency relationship with the seller, he
183. People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d 208, 211 (1978).
184. See People v. Argibay, 379 N.E.2d 191, 194 (N.Y. 1978) ("There mere fact
that Argibay was a middleman or a broker, however, is not enough to warrant a
charge on agency.... All agents are, concededly, middlemen of sorts. But the
converse is not true.")
185. See id. (giving an example of a middleman who aims to satisfy both a
seller and a buyer, but does so largely for his own benefit as one who is not an
agent).
186. See id. at 191, 194-95.
187. See, e.g. People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d 209, 212-13 (N.Y. 1978) (when
assessing whether a steerer has the appropriate motivations becoming of an
agent, courts are typically asking whether the steerer is motivated by his own
self-interested profit).
188. See Argibay, 379 N.E.2d at 194-95 (citing to the duty of loyalty owed to a
principal by an agent in commercial law as having some limited relevance for the
criminal law).
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fails, by definition, to be an agent for the purchaser."189 By
definition, an agent has only one motivation and that is the
motivation to act on behalf of his principal, the buyer. It is
not possible to have two dominant interests or two
principals. Unlike an accomplice defense, which leaves
open the possibility of also being an accomplice to the seller
as well as the buyer, the agency defense forecloses any
relationship with the seller.190 Thus, it provides the escape
from liability for the serious offense of sale.
While both accomplice liability and agency lead to the
imposition of liability on a person for the acts of another,
agency provides a superior defense for a steerer charged
with criminal sale offenses. By narrowly defining the
primary motive of an agent of the buyer, the New York
Court of Appeals prevents a prosecutor from pursuing sale
charges because such a steerer cannot then also be a
principal seller or an accomplice to the seller. 19'
In following the supply side strategy of the war on
drugs, jurisdictions answer the conceptual challenge of
criminalizing the simple street sale by declaring the acts of
sellers serious felonies and the acts of buyers petty
misdemeanors. Rejecting the option of creating a third
type of offense, jurisdictions choose to prosecute the acts of
steerers as the same felonies facing the sellers. In
response, steerers turn to a commercial law concept and
claim to be the purchasing agent of the ultimate buyers.
189. Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 212.
190. One court in dicta suggested the possibility of multiple roles for a steerer,
meaning that a steerer can be both an agent of the buyer and an accomplice of the
seller at the same time. See, e.g. State v. Mansir, 440 A.2d 6, 7 (Me. 1982)
(rejecting the adoption of commercial agency as a defense to its drugs laws on
other grounds, while at the same time observing that a procuring agent defense
would be incomplete and misleading because "[w]hether the defendant acted as
an agent of the purchaser is irrelevant, if at the same time the defendant in fact
aided the seller with the intent of facilitating the sale").
191. Some states disagree with this position. They have prosecuted and
convicted steerers on the theory that they were simultaneously an agent of the
buyer and an accomplice of the seller. See, e.g. State v. Burden, 948 P.2d 991,
994 (Alaska 1997); People v. Edwards, 702 P.2d 555, 559 n.5 (Ca. 1985) ("[One
who acts as a go-between or agent of either the buyer or seller clearly may be
found guilty... as an aider and abettor to the seller.").
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While leaving open the possibility of liability for drug
possession, this agency defense provides the critical
protection against serious sale charge and its lengthy
prison term. A steerer who is an agent is motivated to do
his crime because he wants to advance the interests of his
principal. How does a factfinder 9' assess whether a steerer
has such a motive? Is such a motive provable in a court of
law?
D. Proving (or Trying to Prove) the Agency Defense
Struggling to identify a defendant's motive is not
unique to the agency defense. Indeed, our system of
criminal law revolves around issues of mens rea such that
factfinders are constantly exploring questions regarding
mental states of the defendants. 193  To provide some
direction, in 1978, the New York Court of Appeals issued
guidelines to factfinders on assessing the motives of
steerers and the validity of their agency defenses.
In the lengthy opinion of People v. Lam Lek Chong, the
court featured a laundry list of factors to consider.'94 This
list included the following: (1) the nature and extent of the
relationship between the steerer and the buyer; (2) whether
the buyer or the steerer suggested the purchase; (3)
whether the steerer has had other drug dealings with this
buyer or other buyers and this seller or other sellers; and
(4) whether the steerer profited or stood to profit from the
transaction. 9' In the sister opinion of People v. Roche, the
court added that a factfinder should consider whether the
steerer engaged in "[sialesman-like behavior, commonly
connoting an interest that goes beyond representation of
the buyer alone .... "196 For instance, did the steerer praise
192. See Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 206 ("The determination as to whether
the defendant was a seller, or merely a purchaser doing a favor for a friend, is
generally a factual question for the jury to resolve on the circumstances of the
particular case.").
193. See supra text accompanying note 23.
194. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 207.
195. Id.
196. People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d 208, 212 (N.Y. 1978).
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or apologize for the quality of the product or the manner of
delivery? Did he bargain over the price?197 Furthermore,
the court stated that prior acquaintance with the seller or
familiarity with narcotics in general weigh against a claim
of agency. 198
While enunciating these factors, the court was also
careful to emphasize that the determination as to whether
a steerer is an agent of the buyer is not a strict "legal
formula";199 rather, it is a determination driven by "common
sense and experience. "20 In fact, none of the above-
described factors are determinative of a claim of agency.
For example, profits or benefits received by a steerer are
not absolutely preclusive of agency status. It depends on
the nature of these benefits:
Similarly the fact that the defendant anticipated or received
a profit from the sale may be sufficient to establish his
intent to sell at the time of the transfer. But it is not
unlikely that the buyer, who has obtained drugs with the
aid of the defendant, will offer the defendant a share, a tip
or reimbursement for expenses as a token of friendship or
appreciation for the favor.... Of course receipt of any
benefit, particularly a substantial reward promised in
advance may be sufficient, as a matter of fact, to show that
the defendant did not act solely to accommodate the buyer.
But receipt of some incidental benefit, does not necessarily
or even ordinarily alter the relationship between the
parties, the nature of the transaction or the defendant's
culpability.2°'
Since 1978, numerous cases in New York involving
sale charges against a steerer defendant have involved the
agency defense. Some of them have further developed and
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Lam Lek Chong, 370 N.E.2d at 207.
200. Id. ("But basically the jury must rely on its own common sense and
experience to determine whether, under the circumstances, the defendant was in
fact accommodating a friend or was simply a streetwise peddler attempting to
avoid the penalties for sale.").
201. Id.
20051
BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:653
added to the original guidelines of 1978.202 Indeed, one
observer noted in 1997 that "no fewer than 11 factors have
been outlined by New York courts to determine whether a
defendant is entitled to the defense of agency."2°3
In addition to substantive factors, the high court also
provided procedural guidance and cast the agency defense
not as an affirmative defense for the defendant to prove,
but rather as a failure of proof defense for the State to
disprove beyond a reasonable doubt."°4 In other words,
agency negates "the existence of an essential element of the
crime-the 'sale.' 2 °5 Therefore, if there is any reasonable
view of the evidence that the defendant was an agent of the
ultimate buyer, then the defense should be submitted to
the jury with instructions from the court. °6
Some cases clearly illustrate these common sense
principles of how to evaluate whether a defendant
possessed the necessary motive to qualify as an agent of
the buyer and avoid liability for sale. The simplest are
those in which the defendants actually confess their true
self-interested motives and defeat their own agency
defenses. 207  Even without an admission, other cases
feature enough evidence to defeat an agency defense easily.
For example, in People v. Norman, the defendant
encouraged the female undercover officer to contact him on
his pager, referenced various places where she could make
a purchase, imposed certain tests on the officer to secure
202. See, e.g. People v. Monahan, 493 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't
1995) (holding that the prosecution may present defendant's prior drug
convictions as proof of prior familiarity with the drug trade if a defendant plans to
use the agency defense); People v. Polesenberg, 540 N.Y.S.2d 87 (N.Y. App. Div.
4th Dep't 1989) (denying agency charge where drug sale took place in defendant's
home).
203. Abraham Abramovsky, The Agency Defense in New York Drug
Prosecutions, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1, 1997, at 3.
204. See Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 213. But see People v. Satloff, 437 N.E.2d 271
(N.Y. 1982); People v. White, 539 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1989).
205. Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 213 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 337 F.2d 541,
543 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
206. See Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 213.
207. See, e.g. People v. Newland, 751 N.Y.S.2d 848 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't
2002) (describing how defendant admitted that his sole motive for arranging the
transaction was to obtain a benefit for himself).
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her identity, used his own money to make the purchase,
and promised the officer that she could obtain more packets
from him another time.20 8 All of this was strong evidence of
salesman-like behavior and thus the appellate court
affirmed the conviction for criminal sale of a controlled
substance.0 9 Some of them have further developed and
added to the original guidelines of 1978.210 These cases
create the impression that the agency defense can be
applied consistently and that the guidelines from 1978 do
work. However, this impression is misleading.
There are other examples where the guidelines fail
and courts produce widely inconsistent results in cases
involving the agency defense. Perhaps the most
inconsistency is found in cases where steerers receive some
kind of tip from the ultimate buyer. The issue in such
cases is whether the tip is evidence that the motive of the
steerer was to advance his own self-interest and not the
interest of his principal. If such evidence sufficiently
proves this beyond a reasonable doubt, then the
prosecution has successfully disproved the agency defense
and the steerer is liable for sale.
Consider the following trio of cases. They are all buy
and bust operations in which steerers wanted a share of
the drugs as a tip from the undercover officers pretending
to be ultimate buyers. In the first case, People v. Johnson,
the defendant testified that he arranged the drug
transaction in return for a share of the drugs.211 The court
ruled that a share of drugs is more than an incidental
benefit and thus the defendant was not entitled to the
agency defense.212 In the second case, People v. Coleman,
the defendant testified that he was merely assisting the
undercover officer who approached him for help in
208. See People v. Norman, 715 N.Y.S.2d 802, 803-04 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't
2000).
209. See id.
210. See, e.g. Monahan, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (holding that the prosecution may
present defendant's prior drug convictions as proof of prior familiarity with the
drug trade if a defendant plans to use the agency defense).
211. People v. Johnson, 730 N.Y.S.2d 102, 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2001).
212. Id.
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obtaining cocaine.213 He further admitted that he wanted
to smoke the cocaine with the officer.214 Despite this
confession of an interest in a share of the drugs, the court
ruled that there was sufficient evidence to require an
instruction on the agency defense.215 In the third case,
People v. Metuxrakis, the defendant testified that she was a
prostitute and that she obtained drugs for the undercover
officer in the hope of having sex with him for money or
sharing his drugs.2 16 Despite this statement of self-interest,
the court held that there was sufficient evidence to warrant
the agency charge to the jury.217 Inexplicably, the first
court arrived at the exactly opposite conclusion of the
second and third courts, despite similarity in facts.
A second factor with notable inconsistency is salesman-
like behavior. Courts are not consistent with what they
regard and do not regard as salesman-like behavior.
Consider the following pair of cases. In the first case, People
v. Perez, the defendant directed the undercover officer to
wait by the side of the road while he retrieved the cocaine.218
In the second case, People v. Villacci, the defendant agreed
with the suggestion of a co-defendant that the undercover
officer try a certain brand of crack cocaine and then accepted
the $10 in pre-recorded buy money with which to purchase
the drugs.1 9  Which defendant behaved more like a
salesman with a self-interest in the transaction and which
defendant behaved more like a purchasing agent interested
in the welfare of the undercover officer? Surprisingly, the
court in the first case, People v. Perez, labeled the act of
directing salesman-like behavior while the second court did
not view the endorsement of a particular brand of crack
cocaine as salesman-like touting.22 °
213. People v. Coleman, 728 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2001).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. People v. Metuxrakis, 678 N.Y.S.2d 122, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't
1998).
217. Id.
218. People v. Perez, 540 N.Y.S.2d 456, 457 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1989).
219. See People v. Villacci, 700 N.Y.S.2d 34, 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1999).
220. Compare Perez, 540 N.Y.S.2d 456, with Villacci, 700 N.Y.S.2d 34.
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The inconsistency and variance in the application of
the agency defense is remarkable, especially in light of the
long experience of New York courts with the defense. The
inconsistency appears on both the appellate and trial court
levels.22' Indeed, not only do the trial courts differ in when
they give juries instructions on the agency defense, they
also vary substantially in the instructions that they give.222
What explains the inconsistent legal precedents?
Professor Abramovsky believes that part of the problem is
the fact that the "[a]ppellate courts in New York have given
no guidance as to the comparative weight to be given each
factor."223 He concludes his article in 1997 by imploring the
Court of Appeals to set down "clear and firm guidelines for
[the agency defense's] application."224 This article argues
that the underlying cause of the inconsistency is much
more fundamental. Even if the Court of Appeals
promulgated more definitive guidelines, that improvement
would not ameliorate the falsehood of treating the fleeting
interaction between steerers and ultimate buyers as a
meaningful fiduciary relationship. It is this basic lack of
truth that haunts the application of the agency defense.
III. CALLING FOR AN HONEST CONSIDERATION OF MOTIVE
Instinctively, the agency defense sounds laughable.
Although the concept of a principal-agent relationship is
not strange, it is usually associated with real estate
transactions or the representation of celebrities. In
221. See Abramovsky, supra note 203, at 3 ("Application of these factors by
New York trial and appellate courts... has resulted in inconsistent outcomes.").
222. See id. Professor Abramovsky points out one additional disparity amongst
courts in New York. "Furthermore, despite the Court of Appeals' explicit holding
to the contrary, some trial courts and even intermediate appellate courts have
continued to treat agency as an affirmative defense." (citing the Court of Appeals
opinion in People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 212, and intermediate appellate
opinions in People v. Satloff, 437 N.E.2d 271 (N.Y. 1982) and People v. White, 539
N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1989)).
223. Abramovsky, supra note 203, at 3.
224. Id.
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contrast, agency is a far-fetched cry from the reality of the
drug trade as plied on the streets of this country.
Part III of this article begins with a description of how
drugs are actually sold on the street. Sources for this
description include the efforts of journalists who
interviewed numerous characters in the drug trade and in
the anti-drug war and criminologists who conducted long-
term studies of drug addicts. They all concur that steerers
are often drug addicts themselves who are motivated into
finding drugs for ultimate buyers because they are paid in
money and drugs from both the buyers and the sellers.
There may be a small desire to meet the interests or needs
of the ultimate buyers, but it is the rare occasion in which
this desire is the sole or dominant motive of the steerers.
Part III then offers an explanation for why judges
created the agency defense, despite its lack in truth. As by-
products of the war on drugs, the two reasons were the
increasingly harsh mandatory sentencing for drug offenses
and the ambivalent attitude of Americans towards drug
addicts and their crimes. This article concludes with a
proposal to eliminate the agency defense and to allow for
the consideration of drug addiction in the discretionary
decisions of the criminal justice process. Instead of using
an ill-fitting commercial law concept, this proposal
endorses the use of motive as a vibrant and helpful tool in
the criminal law.
A. The Drug Trade on the Streets
There were an estimated 3.3 million hard-core cocaine
users and 977,000 hard-core heroin users in the United
States in 2000.225 Illicit drugs are a booming global
business generating annual revenues of more than $400
billion.226 Of course, what separates the drug trade from
225. Office of Nat'l Dry Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, What
America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs: 1988-1998, at 8, 10 (2000).
226. Matthew Brzezinski, Re-Engineering the Drug Business, Busted: Stone
Cowboys, Narco-Lords and Washington's War on Drugs 91 (Mike Gray ed., 2002)
(citing a United Nations study) (reprinted from the N.Y. Times Magazine, June
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other global industries is the fact that it is against the law.
Evading the detection of law enforcement is a huge
priority. Towards that end, kingpins in the drug trade
adopt various strategies including the use of "specialized
subcontractors or freelancers on a need-to-know basis" and
"plenty of expendable intermediaries in case someone gets
caught and talks."227
On the worldwide journey taken by two glassines of
heroin,228  the last transaction is still tremendously
important. At the final stage of distribution, the setting is
the street229 and those expendable intermediaries are the
steerers. One longtime user of heroin named Khamillo
(pronounced "Cameo") described his work on 110th Street
in Manhattan in the summer of 1996:
Every day around noon, a hustler would approach him on
110th Street and whisper a two-digit number keyed to the
city's zip codes. "Two-Nine," for instance, signified the
northeast corner of Central Park. When approached by
customers he considered legit, Khamillo would lead them to
the park, where two or three dealers would be waiting on
benches inside the entrance. After making sure Khamillo
was not being followed, one of the dealers would quietly
raise a finger to indicate that he had the goods. And the
deal would quickly go down. Tipped a couple of dollars by
both parties, Khamillo on a good day could make $20 an
hour. "Demand," he observed one afternoon as junkies
buzzed around him, "is as great as ever."211
23, 2002).
227. Id. at 92.
228. See id. at 93 ("By the time it reaches the streets of Baltimore, the world's
most powerful narcotic will have traveled through half a dozen countries, soared
at least 5,000-fold in price and changed hands a hundred times.").
229. See Falco, supra note 120, at 71 ("Street drug markets have spread across
the country, bringing with them crime, violence, and death. In a 1991 survey,
police departments in the nation's fifteen largest cities reported 1,500 drug
markets....").
230. Massing, supra note 2, at 253.
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Khamillo is one of many, many steerers on the
streets.23 1 They perform a variety of functions that connect
ultimate buyers to drug dealers:
Steering, touting, and copping involve overlapping role
relationships among participants in drug-distribution
events. Steerers direct a potential customer to a dealer, who
makes the sale. Touts locate customers for a particular
dealer. Cop men transport money and drugs between a
dealer and buyer, who rarely meet. An individual might
engage in one and usually more such activities during a
given day. A single transaction might involve an
individual's acting as a steerer, a tout, and then a cop
man.
232
In addition to some transactions involving multiple
individuals, there could even be transactions where one
individual performs multiple functions:
From the point of view of a person who wants to buy drugs,
it might be difficult to distinguish a steerer (believed to be
more neutral) from a tout (usually employed by the dealer to
locate customers). If a potential buyer asked a subject who
was steering to cop some drugs for him, the subject would
typically convert to a cop man. Because these three forms of
drug distribution occur frequently and are almost
impossible to keep separate, we have combined them into
one category in the data.23
Like the study in Taking Care of Business, this article has
been using the terms steerer and steering to cover these
acts as one category. After all, from the perspective of the
criminal law, all these acts would be subject to prosecution
on sale charges and can be defended as the acts of a
purchasing agent.
231. See Brzezinski, supra note 226, at 107 ("There are thousands of others...
in Baltimore-and throughout inner cities across the United states-working...
for next to nothing, for a lack perhaps of economic alternatives.").
232. Johnson, supra note 106, at 63.
233. Id.
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In addition to the use of intermediaries, these simple
street sales of modest amounts of drugs are also marked by
the fact that the steerers and the ultimate buyers are
strangers to one another. The lack of familiarity makes
sense because the identities of the steerers and the
locations of the suppliers are always changing in order to
avoid law enforcement. Moreover, in the interest of all the
participants, such sales happen very quickly. As one
author described, "Street drug markets attract 'drive-
through' buyers from wealthier neighborhoods, particularly
the suburbs. Deals are completed in a matter of seconds
with little personal contact."234
Although practical, the lack of familiarity and
quickness become liabilities later on at trial when a steerer
is trying to present a reasonable view of the evidence that
he was a procuring agent for the ultimate buyer. Why
would the steerer undertake the risks of an illegal activity
on behalf of his alleged principal, a complete stranger?
What kind of principal-agent relationship can be formed
between two complete strangers in a matter of minutes?
235
Prosecutors are correct that the reason why
defendants engage in steering is not because of some
principal-agent relationship with the ultimate buyers.
Rather, the reason is much more self-interested and
desperate. As numerous studies have concluded, the most
common motive for criminal behavior is that defendants
are drug addicts.236  In particular, they commit drug
offenses. 37 The drug trade is attractive because they are
234. Falco, supra note 120, at 72.
235. In prosecuting buy-and-bust operations, prosecutors often point to the fact
that the steerer defendant and the undercover officer were complete strangers to
disprove an alleged agency defense. See, e.g. People v. Vasquez, 724 N.Y.S.2d
406, 407 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2001).
236. In New York City, in 2002 81 percent of the adult male arrestees tested
had positive results for at least one type of illegal drug. The most prevalent drug
was cocaine. See Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program (ADAM) Annualized
Site Report for Manhattan, New York. In the country, in 2000 more than half the
test sites reported at least 64 percent of adult male arrestees had recently used
an illegal drug. See National Institution of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice,
Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring 2000 Annual Report 1 (2003).
237. In New York City, in 2002 91 percent and 92 percent of male and female
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paid in money and drugs by both buyers and sellers.
Steerers steer to support their drug habits. Michael
Massing explains how the use of drug addicts to steer and
indeed sell drugs makes a lot of economic sense.
"Ultimately, though, the most ready means of raising
money for drugs is to sell them.... Drug gangs are always
on the lookout for new pitchers, and, given the high risk of
arrest, addicts are often the only candidates around. 3 s
The promise of a "free" high and money is all a drug addict
needs.239
Very little of a steerer's motive has to do with fulfilling
the needs of a principal. Some even believe that very little
of a steerer's motive has to do with making money, at least
not for money's sake.240 What is the end result of this sad
reality of drug trafficking on the streets? The massive war
on drugs has resulted in the arrests and convictions of drug
addicts supporting their habits by steering and selling
drugs.241  Their numbers are overwhelming, with the
annual number of drug offenders admitted to the New York
State prison system growing from 470 in 1970 to 8,521 in
1999.242
adults who were arrested for drug offenses and tested for drugs had positive test
results. See Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program (ADAM) Annualized Site
Report for Manhattan, New York.
238. Massing, supra note 2, at 69-70.
239. See id.
240. "The public stereotype of a drug seller-someone who sells drugs that he
does not use or seldom uses-is rarely found among research subjects. Most
research shows that persons tend to sell drugs they use quite frequently and that
the earnings from such dealings are generally used to support their drug
consumption." Johnson, supra note 106, at 61.
241. Eleven percent of the federal drug-trafficking defendants are classified as
major traffickers, and more than half are low-level offenders. See Jim Dwyer,
Casualty in the War on Drugs, in Busted: Stone Cowboys, Narco-Lords and
Washington's War on Drugs, supra note 226, at 159, 162.
242. See New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, 1999 Crime &
Justice Annual Report Contributing Agency Reports, available at
httpJ/criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnetojsa/cja_99/sec7/docs-drg.htm (last visited
Dec. 7, 2004).
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B. Harsh Sentences
If steerers are not motivated by an interest in their
principals' well-being, then why did courts create the agency
defense? And why do the New York courts continue to apply
it? And why does the New York State legislature continue
to allow them? The answer to these legitimate questions is a
confluence of several different reasons. The first is the
harsh and mandatory nature of criminal sentencing,
especially as it pertains to drug offenses. The second is the
need for an alternative to the addiction defense. The third is
the failure of the criminal law to accommodate the role of
motive with broader acceptance and greater flexibility.
New York State's notorious sentencing laws for drug
offenders are among the harshest in the country. Known
as the Rockefeller Drug Laws, they were passed in 1973
and signed into law by then Governor Nelson Rockefeller.
Only a few years earlier, President Nixon had declared the
war on drugs and New York State, particularly New York
City, was steeped in drugs, crime and fear.243 As a first
response, Governor Rockefeller had tried to establish
residential treatment centers and methadone clinics for
addicts, but they were expensive and did not reduce
crime.2" A frustrated Governor Rockefeller then turned to
the "lock them up and throw away the key" approach 245 and
even admitted that he endorsed this dramatic increase in
penalties because he simply did not know what else to do.245
As a result of the original Rockefeller laws, a first-time
offender convicted of selling more than two ounces of heroin
in New York faced a mandatory minimum of fifteen years
243. "Fear begets intolerance. People and the politicians they elect are more
willing to put up with severe penalties for relatively minor drug offenses when
crime rates are high, as it was in New York City in the late 1960's and early
1970's, the period that produced the Rockefeller laws. At the time, heavy heroin
use in the city was widely blamed for rapidly increasing property crime."
McKinley, supra note 125, at A29.
244. See id.
245. Id.
246. See John Caher, Reform of Rockefeller Drug Laws Unlikely, N.Y.L.J.,
June 8, 2000, at 1.
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to life.247 A first-time offender convicted of selling any
amount of heroin faced a mandatory minimum of one to
three years to fifteen years to life.248 Thus, even upon the
first conviction, steerers faced substantial jail terms that
only increased with every repeat conviction. What was
startling about the Rockefeller Drug Laws is that these
sentences were both high and mandatory.249 While there
were often plea negotiations that could reduce the offense
and the sentence, these were not guaranteed.2 50 They also
did not change the disturbing fact that a defendant who
exercised his constitutional right to go to trial and ended
up convicted received a harsh mandatory minimum.251
The original Rockefeller Drug Laws had a stark
impact. In 1997, the state prison population in New York
was nearly 70,000 people, a figure that is more than five
times the number in 1973.252 Although these sentencing
laws have survived constitutional challenges that they
constitute cruel and unusual punishment,25 opponents of
the Rockefeller Drug Laws still denounced them as
disproportionate.254 They made two common comparisons.
First, a fifteen-year-to-life sentence is the same sentence
that a first-time offender in New York would receive for
247. See infra note 16.
248. See id.
249. See Bob Herbert, The Ruinous Drug Laws, N.Y. Times, July 18, 2002, at
A21 ("The essential problem with the Rockefeller laws is that the punishments
are both draconian and mandatory.").
250. See Paul Schechtman, A Good Deal for Criminal Justice, N.Y.L.J., Mar.
20, 1997, at 2 ("Many defendants arrested for possessing four ounces of cocaine
are offered plea bargains that permit them to plead guilty to class A-2 felonies
and to face as little as 3 years in prison. Indeed, the availability of shock
incarceration, work release, and other diversion programs means that such
defendants can serve only six months in prison before being released.").
251. See id. ("Sadly, it is the defendant who rejects that bargain-who has the
temerity to exercise her constitutional right to trial-who faces the full weight of
the Rockefeller drug laws.").
252. See Massing, supra note 2, at 256.
253. See People v. Broadie, 332 N.E.2d 338 (1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 950
(1975).
254. See, e.g. Herbert, supra note 249, at A21 ("There is no way to justify
sentencing nonviolent low-level drug offenders to prison terms that are longer
than those served by some killers and rapists.").
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intentional murder and almost double the sentence a first-
time rapist would receive.255 Second, a steerer with no prior
record convicted in federal court faces thirty-three to forty-
one months for selling two ounces of heroin and twenty-one
to twenty-seven months for selling two ounces of cocaine. 25 6
In order to receive a fifteen-year sentence, a federal
defendant would have to sell more than ten kilograms of
heroin or fifty kilograms of cocaine.5 7
Despite these astonishing comparisons, an odd alliance
of reform activists was unable to overcome the powerful
economic and political interests of legislators supporting these
draconian sentences.2 8  Finally, thirty-one years after the
passage of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, the New York State
legislature acceded in December 2004 to the increasingly loud
demands for reform and reduced the harsh mandatory
minimums."9 Today, a first-time offender who sells more
than two ounces of heroin in New York faces a sentence of
eight to twenty years in prison and a first-time offender who
sells any amount of heroin in New York faces a sentence of
one to one-and-a-half years in prison.26° While notable, these
reductions are only the tip of the iceberg as reform activists
continue their fight against mandatory sentencing.261
255. See, e.g. Shechtman, supra note 250, at 2.
256. See id. (explaining that these sentencing calculations assume that the
defendant is convicted after trial and that federal sentencing guidelines would
only impose twenty-four to thirty months for two ounces of heroin and twelve to
eighteen months for two ounces of cocaine if the defendant pled guilty instead).
257. See id.
258. This alliance included various judges on the Court of Appeals, parents of
imprisoned drug offenders, civil rights groups concerned with the racial
implications, celebrities and even some corrections associations. See John Caher,
Clemency Granted to Rockefeller Drug Inmates, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 26, 2000, at 1.
They charged that state legislators, especially from upstate New York, were
reluctant to change the sentencing laws because their local constituents relied on
prisons for their economic livelihood and because the prisoners themselves were
included in crucial population counts for drawing their legislative districts, even if
the prisoners could not vote as felons. See Brent Staples, Why Some Politicians
Need Their Prisions to Stay Full, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 2004, at A16.
259. See Elizabeth Benjamin, New Drug Laws Signed, Times Union, Dec. 15,
2004, at B3.
260. See infra note 16.
261. See Leslie Eaton & Al Baker, Changes Made to Drug Laws Don't Satisfy
Advocates, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 2004, at B1.
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C. Ambivalence about Addiction
If there is no room to accommodate drug addicts who
steer for a living in sentencing, then the liability stage is an
option. Harsh and mandatory sentences for drug offenses
would pose less of a problem if there were ways through
which low level offenders such as steerers could escape
criminal liability. Such steerers share the same motive as
the ultimate buyers yet their moral culpability is greater.
Earning a living through selling drugs to other addicts is
more reprehensible than making an honest living. The
difference, though, is much less than the difference in
penalties between misdemeanor possession and felony sale
charges. But if rigid and politically intractable sentencing
guidelines are part of the problem, perhaps defenses to
liability offer a solution.
Defendants have tried to offer a simple addiction
defense where they contend that their drug addictions
should serve as a defense to their crimes. For example, in
United States v. Moore, the defendant claimed that he was
not responsible for his possession of heroin because he was
a drug addict with an overpowering need to use the drug.262
He tried to equate his loss of control due to addiction with
the loss of control in a duress defense. He was coerced into
possessing the heroin by his addiction, rather than by a
threat of death.63 The D.C. Court of Appeals rejected his
defense on the grounds that the duress defense does not
extend to every cause of loss of self-control.2 6 The problem
with addiction as a defense is that it is not "a confirmable
disability that adequately distinguishes the [defendant]
from the general populace." 265 A defendant's claim that he
262. See United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 980 (1973).
263. See id. at 1178 (quoting from defendant's brief).
264. See id. at 1179-80.
265. Robinson, supra note 105, § 177(e)(7), at 364 ("The less objective and less
confirmable nature of psychological addiction makes it more difficult to
distinguish the psychologically addicted actor from others in the population, and
thus makes it more difficult to limit the precedential effect of his acquittal.
Similarly, such a less definite disability offers less confirmation of the existence of
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is unable to refrain from his offense because of addiction is
not verifiable and a defense must be "both gross and
verifiable" to excuse criminal liability.266
Likewise, in the 1968 case of Powell v. Texas,267 the
Supreme Court declined 5-4 to overturn a conviction for
public drunkenness on the grounds that the defendant
suffered from chronic alcoholism.2 6 This case was a
transparent attempt269 to test the controversial holding of an
earlier Supreme Court case, Robinson v. California, where
the Court had struck down as unconstitutional a criminal
statute that punished the status of being an addict .27  As
Professor Greenawalt describes, Robinson left open the
question, "[i]f it is unconstitutional to punish someone for
suffering from a disease, can it be constitutional to punish
him for acts that are caused by the disease?"2 71
Without success, Powell tried to argue that an
affirmation of his conviction would also constitute cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.272 In the plurality opinion, the Supreme
Court worried about the ramifications of a constitutional
principle that forbids the punishment of conduct that is in
some sense compelled by addiction. "If Leroy Powell cannot
be convicted of public intoxication, it is difficult to see how
a State can convict an individual for murder, if that
individual, while exhibiting normal behavior in all other
respects, suffers from a 'compulsion' to kill, which is an
'exceedingly strong influence,' but 'not completely
overpowering. '273 Although the dissenters proposed a line
of demarcation that would allow addiction to be a defense
only to conduct which is "a characteristic and involuntary
the impairment of control required to establish the excusing condition.").
266. Moore, 486 F.2d at 1183-84.
267. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
268. See id. at 537.
269. See id. at 522.
270. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668 (1962).
271. Kent Greenawalt, "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth Amendment:
Implications ofPowell v. Texas, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 927, 929 (1969).
272. Powell, 392 U.S. at 517.
273. Id. at 534.
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part of the pattern of the disease,"274 the plurality refused
to issue a constitutional principle of mens rea or even
voluntariness.275
Both United States v. Moore and Powell v. Texas
feature long discussions of whether drug addicts should be
excused for criminal acts that are motivated by their
addictions. Both conclude for different reasons that they
should not. While the D.C. Court of Appeals rejects
addiction as an unverifiable claim, the Supreme Court is
concerned about the inability to place principled limits on
such an excuse. Underlying their reasoning is the
American ambivalence about the nature of addiction and
the moral culpability of addicts.
Indeed, scattered throughout their opinions are
descriptions of the latest studies on addiction. Are addicts
suffering from an uncontrollable disease that attacks them
psychologically and/or physiologically?276 Or are addicts
morally culpable actors who have some control over their
acts? Did the addicts make bad choices in getting addicted
in the first place? Do they also then make punishable
choices in steering drugs to support their habits?
American attitudes, studies, and politics have been all
over the map on these very questions. As a result,
American criminal law and drug policies have vacillated
between treating drug addicts as hardened criminals277 or
as sympathetic bearers of a disease who need treatment.
They seem to mimic the cycles of crime waves and economic
booms and busts. Logically, they also follow the pendulum
swings between utilitarianism and retributivism in the
criminal law.
It was in the midst of one of these swings that the
agency defense came to life and has continued to survive.
274. Id. at 559 n.2 (Fortas. J., dissenting).
275. See id. at 535-36.
276. See Robinson, supra note 105, § 194(c), at 456 (theorizing that
physiological addictions are much more effective and accepted as excuses than
psychological addictions).
277. See, e.g. Massing, supra note 2, at 85-86 ("Ever since passage of the
Harrison Narcotics Act in 1914[,] ... Americans had come to view addicts as
dangerous deviants who had to be isolated from society.").
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Because legislatures had foreclosed sentence reductions
and courts had rejected straightforward addiction defenses,
steerers seized upon this commercial law concept for a way
past their sale charges. They did so even though there was
very little truth in the claim that they were purchasing
agents for their ultimate buyers. The agency defense
received the endorsement of the Court of Appeals, trial
judges, and jurors because almost from its beginning all
these decision makers in the criminal justice system
realized the power of the agency defense. Through it, they
are able to acquit those sympathetic steerers who were
driven into the drug trade only to support their own habits
on the heinous sale charges. They achieve proportionate
justice, even if indirectly. Judicially created and protected,
the agency defense is the only politically viable option for
accommodating sympathetic motives of drugs addicts who
steer.
D. The Proposal for Motive-Sensitive Sentencing
While valuable, the agency defense does come with a
cost. As explained in part II, courts use numerous factors
in trying to assess whether a reasonable view of the
evidence would support the status of purchasing agent.
The guidelines espoused by the Court of Appeals are not
definitive or rigid. Instead, the Court of Appeals urges trial
courts and jurors ultimately to use their common sense. As
a result of this freedom and the inherent falsity of a
principal-agent relationship, courts are inconsistent in
what they regard as salesman-like behavior or an
incidental tip versus a substantial self-interest. Trial
judges and jurors appear to predetermine which steerers
deserve to escape liability from sale and interpret the
evidence towards that end.
The lack of consistency and the use of a legal fiction
are costly. If a defendant was obviously steering drugs for
his own drug problem, then the trial judge will likely grant
a request for instructions on the agency defense and submit
the question to the jury. More often than not, the jury will
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be relieved to have some lawful option that avoids a harsh
sentence for the sympathetic defendant, even if that option
is purely a legal fiction. However, what is unseen are all
those defendants whose criminal acts are also motivated by
drug addictions whose requests for jury instructions are
denied or whose juries are not sufficiently persuaded of
their agent status. Because they were unable to present an
honest plea based on evidence of their addictions, they are
most likely convicted of sale charges and receive
Rockefeller drug sentences. The inconsistency in the
application of the agency defense leads to an unacceptable
inequality of justice.
Perhaps some observers support the agency defense
because it is an option that allows for some sanity and
some proportionate justice for some drug offenders in New
York State. However, like any other unnecessary legal
fiction, over time its existence and application undermines
the normative power of the criminal law. It achieves its
justice in an underhanded and untruthful manner.
Participants in the criminal justice system, ranging from
defendants to undercover police officers to jurors, lose their
respect for the rule of law and believe that it can be
manipulated by whoever is in power. This article proposes
an alternative to the agency defense.
This alternative is to reform the way that motive is
regarded in the criminal law and to mandate more open
and direct consideration of motive in decisions. For the
problem of the steerer and the simple street sale, the
relevant forums to consider motive are the discretionary
forums of charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing.
Because drug addiction does concededly have low
provability and ever-changing moral potency, it should not
be an outright defense from criminal liability. Convictions
are the moral condemnations of a community, and thus
only highly provable and morally potent motives such as
self-defense should lead to acquittals.
One particular effectuation of this proposal would be to
reform the sentencing rules such that judges must evaluate
the motives of a defendant convicted of sale. The motives
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of the defendant can be one of many factors that a judge
considers. If the judge believes that such motives are
deserving of a reduction in sentence, the judge should have
a wider range of possible sentences from which to choose.
This range can include treatment as well as imprisonment.
Unlike many current demands to reform the notorious
Rockefeller drug laws in New York State, this proposal is
not necessarily seeking to replace jail terms with long-term
drug rehabilitation programs or to reduce the length of jail
terms for all criminal sale convictions.278  What this
proposal does seek is mandatory consideration of motives
by judges as a sentencing factor and greater flexibility for
judges in selecting an appropriate sentence to match their
assessments.
In addition to achieving more proportional justice, this
proposal will restore credibility and greater transparency
to the criminal justice system. It will not undermine the
need for effective social control and it will accommodate
addiction's low provability and ambivalence about moral
culpability issues. Finally and perhaps most importantly,
it will be one step closer towards bringing motive into the
criminal law where it belongs.
278. Those may also be worthwhile improvements; however, they are outside
the scope of this article.
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